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Case No. 20030263-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from jury convictions for three counts of distributing or arranging 
to distribute controlled substances, enhanced first degree (methamphetamine), and second 
degree (marijuana) felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), (b) (2002), 
and two counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, enhanced first 
degree (methamphetamine) and second degree (marijuana) felonies, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), (b) (2002). R64-65, 368-372. This Court has jurisdiction 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Can defendant challenge a pretrial ruling allowing the State to introduce his 
prior convictions in its case-in-chief if the State did not introduce the convictions and 
defendant himself introduced them after the State rested? 
No standard of review applies because a defendant who preemptively introduces 
evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not challenge its admission on 
appeal. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755-760 (2000). 
2. Was probable cause established where the search warrant affidavit set forth 
that police electronically monitored a confidential informant who went to defendant's 
condominium and bought drugs from him on three different occasions? 
In reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, the appellate court 
"assess [es] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^  14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted), cert denied, 
535 U.S. 1062 (2002). The appellate court also "afford[s] the magistrate's decision great 
deference and considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a 
common sense fashion." Id. (citations omitted). 
3. Can defendant challenge the trial court's denial of his attempted cross-
examination of a State's witness under rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, where 
defendant led the trial court to believe there was no authority to support his claim that 
embezzlement was a crime of dishonesty? 
Because defendant affirmatively waived this issue when he failed to provide any 
supporting authority for his claim as per the trial court's invitation, see R493:283-285, no 
standard of review applies. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, Iffl 12, 16, 61 P.3d 1062 
(finding affirmative waiver where trial court invited defendant to object, if necessary, and 
defendant failed to do so). 
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4. Is defendant entitled to a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered 
impeachment evidence? 
A trial court's denial of a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence is 
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 27,25 P.3d 985. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Copies of pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules, including: U.S. 
CONST, amend. IV; Utah. R. Evid. 404(b); Utah R. Evid. 608(b); and Utah R. Evid. 609(a), 
are included in addendum F. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Amended Information with three counts of distributing 
or arranging to distribute controlled substances, enhanced first degree (methamphetamine), 
and second degree (marijuana) felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), 
(b) (2002), and two counts of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, 
enhanced first degree (methamphetamine), and second degree (marijuana) felonies, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), (b) (2002). R64-65. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
After using a confidential informant (CI) to make three separate controlled buys of 
marijuana (once) and methamphetamine (twice) from defendant at his condominium, officers 
with the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force obtained a search warrant for defendant's 
!The facts are recited "in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 
UT30,1f2,25P.3d985. 
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person and condominium on 6 March 2001. See Rl 93-196 (a copy of the search warrant and 
affidavit is attached in addendum A). That search yielded $1450 cash including the $100 bill 
used to make the third controlled buy, marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. 
See, e.g., R494:50-57, 128-129. 
Hartley Comes Forward. Officer Machielson's investigation of defendant began after 
Russ Hartley, a confidential informant, contacted the strike force with information about 
defendant's, and other's, drug-related activities. R494:98-99. Hartley reported that he had 
bought marijuana from defendant in the past and was sure defendant would sell marijuana 
or methamphetamine to him now. R494:102. Officer Machielson checked defendant's 
address and verified that he lived in Ogden, Utah, at 1120 Canyon Road, #2, and that he 
operated the Tile Man business also located in Ogden at 1452 Washington Blvd. R494:100-
101. 
Tip-a-Cop Complaint. In the course of checking defendant's background, the officer 
"came across a, for lack of better terms, intelligence report—or a complaint. That's probably 
the best way to say it, a complaint." R494:103. "This particular . . . complaint came from 
[the Tip-a-Cop] line." Id. The complaint was that defendant was "involved in either drug 
possession or drug sales," at both his Canyon Road condo and his tile store on Washington 
Boulevard. R494:103-104. Based on Hartley's information and the anonymous tip, Officer 
Machielson decided to proceed further with his investigation of defendant by setting up a 
controlled buy. R494:102. Because Hartley had no pending charges to work off, Officer 
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Machielson agreed to financially compensate him for his assistance in setting up the 
controlled buy with defendant. R494:101-102. 
Operating Procedure for Controlled Buys. Standard operating procedure for a 
controlled buy using a confidential informant is to 
meet with them, their persons are searched. If they're driving a vehicle, the 
vehicle is searched to ensure that they don't have any contraband, any 
weapons, any things like that. We take their money from them and we hold on 
to it. We give it back[,] but we take that and hold it because we don't want 
that to get mixed up with the money that we give them. We fit them with an 
electronic monitoring device. They are given an amount, whatever the agreed 
upon purchase is, in this particular case $100. I record those serial numbers 
either by writing them down on my notes or by photocopying them, it depends 
on whether I'm at the office before or I'm not, if I have photo machine. 
At that point, depending on the situation, sometimes a phone call is 
made, sometimes it's not made. At that point, we—the informant leaves us. 
We observe the informant go from our supervision to the target location. We 
do the best we can to monitor what's being said. And once they leave, we 
watch them from when they leave until they come back to us. 
R494:104-105. 
First Controlled Buy. Officer Machielson followed these procedures when he met 
with Hartley on 9 February 2001 at the Cherrywood condominium clubhouse to set up a 
controlled buy for marijuana from defendant. R493:171. Officer Machielson searched 
Hartley's person and fitted him with an electronic monitoring device. R494:105. Officer 
Machielson also took all of Hartley's money and gave him a $100 bill, having previously 
recorded the denomination and serial number. R494:105-106. Because Hartley "was not 
driving a vehicle," Officer Machielson "didn't have to search that." R494:105. Hartley then 
called defendant, and Officier Machielson heard him ask for defendant and order "a foot of 
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green board." R494:106. "Green board" was defendant's "code name for marijuana," and 
"sheetrock" was defendant's code name for meth. R493:172; R494:107. 
After completing the phone call to defendant, Hartley left the club house and Officer 
Machielson watched as he walked across the street to defendant's condo at 1120 Canyon 
Road, #2, and knocked on the door. R493:173; R494:107. Officer Machielson heard the door 
open and Hartley make contact with a male which Hartley later informed him was defendant. 
R494:108. Officer Machielson heard no other voices in the apartment. Id. However, the 
phone rang while Hartley was in the condo and Officer Machielson "heard the male voice 
other than [Hartley's] say something to the effect of, I don't—I don't want the traffic to my 
shop, come to my condo." R494:109. 
Hartley accompanied defendant downstairs, where defendant took a duffle bag out of 
the dryer, retrieved approximately one pound of marijuana, and grabbed a scale from a 
nearby shirt to weigh out $100 worth of marijuana. R493:174. Defendant also showed 
Hartley all the different kinds of meth he kept in some grout cans, and offered some to 
Hartley, but he declined. R493:174-175. 
Officer Machielson heard Hartley and defendant discuss price: "'hundred,' 'okay 
hundred,' things like that." R494:108. Officer Machielson then watched as Hartley left the 
condo and walked back to the clubhouse. Id. As Hartley walked away from the condo, 
Officer Machielson saw a car pull into defendant's driveway. R494:l 10. Once back at the 
clubhouse, Hartley was searched according to procedure and the marijuana he had purchased 
from defendant was retrieved from his person. R494:109-110. No other contraband was 
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found on Hartley. Id. After the electronic transmitter was removed and Hartley's own 
money was returned to him, he was compensated for his time. R494:110-111. 
Second Controlled Buy. Officer Machielson contacted Hartley again on 27 February 
2001 and asked him to set up another controlled buy with defendant, this time for meth. 
R493:176; R494:l 12-113. The same search procedures as previously were followed. Id. 
Defendant took Hartley into the kitchen where he weighed out a $100 worth of meth. 
R493:177. Over the electronic transmitter, Officer Machielson heard Hartley's and 
defendant's voices discuss "three different kinds," and one of them stated, "I don't like the 
brown stuff." R494:113. Then Officer Machielson heard Hartley say, "Just give me a 
hundred." Id. Hartley then left the condo and walked back to the clubhouse, where following 
the same procedures as before, he was searched and the meth retrieved from his person. 
R493:178;R494:113-115. 
Third Controlled Buy. Officer Machielson contacted Hartley a third time on 5 March 
2001 and asked him to do another controlled buy for meth. R493:179; R494:115. They 
followed the same procedures as on the previous two buys. R493:179; R494:117. This time, 
however, defendant's girlfriend Lori was also present inside the condo. Id. Defendant 
offered Hartley two different kinds of meth, which he kept in a caulking tube. R493:180. 
Hartley asked for "the best," and defendant "weighed out a hundred dollars worth." Id. 
Following this conversation, Officer Machielson saw Hartley exit the condo and walk back 
to the club house where meth was once again retrieved from his person. R493:180; 
R494:117. Additionally, Hartley reported seeing other controlled substances in the condo, 
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specifically, more meth "and also a fairly substantial quantity of marijuana." R493:180; 
R494:118. 
The Search Warrant. Shortly after the third buy was completed, Officer Machielson 
prepared a search warrant for defendant's person and condo to look for marijuana, meth, and 
related paraphernalia. See, e.g., R193-196, add. A. Officer Machielson included the 
anonymous tip-a-cop report, Hartley' s three successful controlled buys from defendant at the 
Canyon Road condo, and defendant's criminal history, "that he ha[d] several arrests for 
distribution and possession of a controlled substances dating back to 1986." Rl 94-195, add. 
A. Based on Officer Machielson's affidavit, the magistrate determined there was probable 
cause to believe that marijuana, meth, and related paraphernalia would be found on 
defendant's person and inside his condo and signed the warrant. R196, add. A. 
The Search. The search warrant was executed the day after the third controlled buy, 
6 March 2001. R494:119. Through earlier surveillance, police knew defendant was at his 
tile shop, not the condo, at the time they sought to execute the warrant. R494:121. Three 
officers were sent to the tile shop where they made contact with defendant and obtained the 
keys to the condo. Id. Defendant told them that his girlfriend Lori was then at the condo. 
Id. When officers surveilling the condo learned that Lori was inside, they determined to 
knock on the door, rather than to wait for the officers coming with defendant's keys. Id. 
Although police knocked repeatedly, and saw movements within the condo, Lori did not 
answer the door. Id. 
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While police were still knocking on the condo door, the officers with defendant's keys 
arrived. R494:122. However, none of the keys that defendant had provided fit the door. Id. 
Police eventually used a battering ram to force their way into the condo, all the while 
continuing to identify themselves as law enforcement officers. R494:122. Officer 
Machielson, one of the first officers through the door, observed that the condo appeared 
"messy." R494:123. Lori was found coming out of the master bathroom and was ordered to 
the floor. Id. Officer McGuire interviewed Lori, who denied that she had been destroying 
evidence, but admitted that she used meth on a "social basis." R494:48. Lori also denied 
that she sold controlled substances from the condo, but admitted that defendant, her "live-in 
boyfriend," "had dealt from the home before." Id. Specifically, Lori told Officer McGuire 
that two weeks earlier, defendant had "had a large amount of meth inside the apartment." 
R494:49. Lori said that defendant "usually hides the dope and doesn't tell her where because 
of her use." Id. 
Once the house was checked and cleared for other persons inside, the officers began 
collecting evidence. R494:124. As Officer Machielson began looking around he saw 
drawers pulled out, some of them tipped over, plants that had been tipped over 
and like pulled out, you know, where the dirt comes out and root ball is there. 
I went downstairs [and] noticed there was several grout cans that had grout 
spilled out of them and there was some plastic bags laying around. It appeared 
to me that somebody had been frantically going through the house. . . . And, 
you know, grabbing a drawer and dumping it out. 
R494:124-125. The ensuing search yielded $1450 cash under a mattress (including the $100 
bill used for the third controlled buy), defendant's identification in the bedroom, and a 
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marijuana joint in the living room. R494:50-53,126,128-129,145. Lori also directed police 
to look around in defendant's tools in the basement, and with Lori's assistance, Officer 
Machielson found a baggy containing meth inside the lid of a spray paint can. R494:49,139-
140. Officer Machielson also consulted Hartley over the phone: "He had been in the 
apartment before, he saw where the dope came out of. I thought, you know, maybe he would 
be able to direct me. He directed me over towards the washer and dryer," also downstairs. 
R494:141. A further search of the basement yielded a digital weighing scale inside a red 
shirt and marijuana inside a green duffle bag. R494:53, 57. 
Defendant Threatens Hartley. Thereafter, Hartley contacted Officer Machielson on 
15 April 2001, to complain that he had been receiving threatening phone calls from 
defendant. R494:146. Officer Machielson listened to the phone messages defendant left 
Hartley and observed that they were becoming increasingly "aggressive" and "more 
threatening in manner." R494:147. The next day, 16 April 2001, Officer Machielson 
arranged to have Hartley make a three-way phone call to defendant from his (Officer 
Machielson's) office, through Hartley's cell phone. R494:147. While Officer Machielson 
listened, defendant repeatedly asked who Hartley told, and that he "guess[ed]" Hartley "must 
have something to do with it." R494:148. At one point, Hartley told defendant that he 
"play[ed] with far badder people than you do," and defendant replied, "like who, the cops?" 
R494:148. 
Officer Machielson spoke with defendant about the threatening phone calls that same 
day, at defendant's tile shop. R494:148-149. When Officer Machielson told defendant he 
10 
needed to talk to him about "some phone calls [he had] been making," defendant replied, "To 
who, [Hartley]?" R494:150. Defendant initially denied that there was anything threatening 
about the phone calls, claiming that he and Hartley "kind of always talked to each other that 
way." Id, Defendant subsequently changed his story "from they always talk to each other 
that way[,] to he owes me money for a paint gun or I borrowed him [sic] some money or 
loaned him some money or something." Id, During the conversation, defendant said that his 
address was 1120 Canyon Rd.,#2, where he lived with his girlfriend Lori Lucero.2 Id, 
Officer Machielson Identifies Defendant's Voice. Comparing the distinctive male 
voice he overheard talking with Hartley during all three controlled buys to defendant's 
recorded phone conversations, and his (Officer Machielson's) own conversations with 
defendant, Officer Machielson determined that the voice "sound[ed] exactly the same." 
R494:ll 6. 
Jury Conviction. At trial, defendant claimed that he had lived with Lori at the condo 
right after he got out of prison, from 1997 to 2000, and that he kept things at the condo, but 
denied that he was living with her when the search warrant was executed. R495:143-148. 
Rather, defendant claimed that he was living out of his tile shop. R495:144. Defendant also 
denied ever using drugs with or selling them to Hartley. R495:150-51. He further denied 
being at the condo on the dates of the first two controlled buys, 9 February 2001, and 27 
February 2001. Id, Defendant did admit to being at the condo on the date of the third 
2Lori was married to defendant's brother before he passed away in 1985. 
R495:143. 
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controlled buy, 5 March 2001, running into Hartley there, and Hartley giving him a $ 100 bill. 
R495:151-153. According to defendant, however, he was only at the condo to have lunch, 
and Hartley merely repaid a loan defendant had made him after he (Hartley) was caught 
stealing and consequently lost his job. R495:153-154. Defendant also denied that any of the 
drugs and paraphernalia found in the condo were his. R495:160-161. 
On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he had been convicted of three counts 
of distribution of a controlled substance, and one count of possession with intent to distribute. 
R495:167. See State's Exh. #17 (certified copy of defendant's 1993 convictions). He also 
admitted to doing time for a parole violation. Id. Defendant additionally admitting telling 
Lori to testify that had never lived with her in the condo, because, according to defendant, 
that was the truth. R495:175. See also R495:192. Defendant also acknowledged that he 
kept property at Lori's, including his identification and the $1450 cash found during the 
search. R495:178-180. 
Defendant denied, however, telling Lori to ask another friend to "bury [the] sheetrock 
[and] nails." R495:172-173. He admitted, however, telling Lori to tell the same friend to get 
all the "yow" together and bury it. R495:174. According to defendant, "yow" meant cat 
litter. Id, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant cannot challenge the admission of evidence that he was previously 
convicted for distributing marijuana because he introduced it on his own direct examination. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that a defendant who preemptively 
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introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not challenge its 
admission on appeal. See Ohler v. United States', 529 U.S. 753 (2000). 
Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's waiver here, evidence of his prior 
convictions was admissible not only to impeach him, but to establish his identity as the 
dealer/distributor who sold the marijuana and methamphetamine and possessed the 
contraband found pursuant to the search warrant. 
Point II. The trial court properly ruled that the search warrant affidavit established 
probable cause based on information contained therein that a confidential informant (Hartley) 
conducted three controlled buys with defendant at his condo for marijuana and 
methamphetamine, which controlled buys were electronically monitored by police. 
Moreover, the controlled buys were themselves sufficient to establish probable cause whether 
or not additional information from an anonymous source that defendant was involved in drug 
trafficking was also included in the affidavit. Thus, defendant's complaints about the 
anonymous "intelligence report" in the affidavit lack merit and should be rejected. 
Point III. The trial court refused to allow defendant to cross-examine Hartley under 
rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, regarding an alleged theft from his (Hartley' s)former 
employer on the ground that theft crimes are not necessarily probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. Although the trial court offered to reconsider its ruling if defendant could 
provide any authority for his claim that embezzlement was a crime of untruthfulness, 
defendant never acted on that invitation. In failing to accept the trial court's invitation, 
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defendant effectively led the trial court to believe that there was no supporting authority. His 
claim of error is thus affirmatively waived. 
Even if the Court were to overlook the affirmative waiver here, however, defendant 
himself testified that Hartley was fired for stealing; thus, the jury ultimately heard the very 
evidence defendant claims to have been erroneously denied an opportunity to elicit. 
Point IV. Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
new trial motion based on a claim of newly discovered impeachment evidence. As a general 
rule, newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial where its only use is 
impeachment. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 28, 25 P.3d 985. Thus, defendant fails to show 
any abuse of discretion here. 
Even if the Court were to disregard the Boyd rule, however, evidence that Hartley 
used cocaine, in addition to marijuana, and did not quit using drugs until December 2000 
rather than November 2000, as he initially claimed, would not have influenced the well-
supported jury verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE A PRETRIAL RULING 
ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE HIS PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS IN ITS CASE-IN-CHIEF IF THE STATE DID NOT 
ACT ON THE RULING AND DEFENDANT HIMSELF INTRODUCED 
THE EVIDENCE AFTER THE STATE RESTED 
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling granting the State's 
motion in limine under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, to admit his four felony 
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convictions during its case-in-chief. R484:47-48. See Aplt Br. at 13-14. Defendant 
specifically complains that his felony distribution convictions are too remote and dissimilar 
to be probative here. Aplt. Br. at 13-22. Defendant is precluded from raising his challenge, 
however, because the State never acted on the pretrial ruling in its case-in-chief; defendant, 
not the State, introduced his convictions during his own direct examination. See R495:143, 
162. The United States Supreme Court recently held that a defendant who preemptively 
introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not challenge its 
admission on appeal. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000). 
Proceedings below. The State moved in limine to admit defendant's four felony 
convictions for distributing and possession with the intent to distribute. Rl 09-117. The State 
argued that the felonies were admissible in its case-in-chief because they were highly 
probative of defendant's intent, knowledge, plan, and preparation. Rl 13-117; R484:42. 
Moreover, defendant's felonies were unlikely to "rouse the jury to hostility"; thus, their 
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rl 16-
117. 
Defendant countered that his felonies were not sufficiently similar to the instant 
distribution charges and were ten years old. R129-130. 
The trial court heard the parties' oral arguments during a pretrial hearing on 22 April 
2002. See R484 (copies of the relevant transcript pages are attached in addendum C). There, 
the prosecutor clarified that defendant's convictions were only eight and a half years old, not 
ten years old, and analogized to other rules which "talk about [felonies] being admitted less 
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than 10 years old." R484:40, add. C. The prosecutor further pointed out that defendant "did 
go to prison on those prior offenses, he did go back once on a parole violation[], so that 
lessens the time after he was released from those [prior offenses to] when he committed these 
new offenses." Id. The prosecutor also responded affirmatively when the trial court asked 
if he was seeking to admit the convictions in the State's case-in-chief: "[UJnder rule 404(b) 
that's part of [Jour case in chief, your Honor, to show his intent.... [Defendant has] put his 
intent specifically at issue in this case by saying he wasn't involved in the possession of the 
drugs that were located in his home." R484:40-41. The prosecutor argued that defendant's 
distributing convictions were similar to the instant charges because as here, the underlying 
facts involved both methamphetamine and marijuana "buys [] made from the defendant's 
home, they were controlled buys by a strike force agency[.]... In that case he also denied 
the fact that he had any ownership of those drugs." R484:41-42, add. C. Finally, the 
prosecutor clarified that he only intended to offer the certified convictions and not to "bring 
in officers to specifically talk about those prior buys." R484:42, add. C. 
Trial counsel maintained that defendant's distributing convictions were insufficiently 
similar to the instant charges because, contrary to the prosecutor's representation, defendant' s 
convictions did not involve methamphetamine. R484:42, add. C. Additionally, defendant's 
prior convictions involved selling from "a place where he clearly was staying with a 
roommate," but the instant charges did not. R484:43, add. C. "So that coupled with the fact 
that this one includes meth as well is different." Id. Finally, trial counsel argued that the 
felonies were not probative of defendant's intent: "[I]f the Court would allow [the 
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prosecutor] to use this for this purpose, any time any defendant enters a denial to the charges 
rather than an admission to the charges, all of a sudden the issue of, well, now your intent 
comes into play. We've argued, in essence, that we're saying the best they have is a 
constructive possession." R484:42-43, add. C. 
The trial court asked for clarification of trial counsel's argument that the convictions 
were not probative of defendant's intent: "If a defendant is saying, hey, this is a mistake, I 
didn't have anything to do with these drugs that are found in my home or where I'm residing, 
and a jury learns that he's been convicted before for the same thing, doesn't that evidence 
go directly to this question of his intent?" R484:43, add. C. Trial counsel argued that the 
State had to prove it was defendant's residence, and that the felonies could only be used to 
enhance the charges: "This isn't used to show the intent because it's different, Judge. That 
was not his residence, the first time was his residence and that. The first time involved 
marijuana, this time involves marijuana and methamphetamine. It's clearly different. They 
can't use t[hose] conviction[s] and bootstrap to show intent on this one." R484:44, add. C. 
The trial court agreed that if defendant's conviction had "nothing to do with selling 
or distributing drugs, for example, let's say it was a theft conviction or a forgery, then it 
wouldn't have any relevance. But here they're trying to show a similarity between what he 
was convicted of in 199[3] and what he's on trial for at this time in 2002, so isn't that a little 
different?" Id. Trial counsel disagreed, arguing that "it [was] a quantum leap for them to be 
able to do that, to bootstrap this in." R484:45. According to trial counsel, "the Court [could] 
look at it and see that you know what, we're clearly well beyond any notion of modus 
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operandi or of a pattern of what had happened here. We're almost to the 10-year period here 
where even the Court wouldn't entertain this discussion." Id. 
The trial court specifically noted that case law cited by the State, including State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991), was "fairly similar to what we're talking about here, 
evidence involving prior convictions for offenses that are similar to what he's on trial for. 
And in those cases, the court said that it was all right to admit the convictions." R484:45, 
add. C. Trial counsel maintained that "in relation to time and the dissimilarity in the two 
offenses," the convictions were inadmissible. R484:45-46, add. C. 
Following trial counsel's argument, the prosecutor clarified that the prior convictions 
only involved marijuana: "I thought that they involved methamphetamine as well but they 
involve marijuana." R484:46, add. C. The prosecutor argued that the convictions were still 
similar and probative however, because "there was a large quantity of marijuana that was 
found in that case. There was almost a pound of marijuana that was found in this case. All 
evidence is that this was [defendant's] residence. His girlfriend indicated that these drugs 
were his that he had sold from the house in the past. This isn't in a constructive possession 
case as far as that goes." Id. 
The trial court granted the motion to admit the evidence. R484:47-48, add. C. 
Despite prevailing on the motion, the State did not offer any evidence of defendant's 
felonies during its case-in-chief. However, after the State rested, defendant introduced the 
convictions during his direct examination. R495:143, add. C. When trial counsel asked if 
"at one point in time, [he] and Lori [Lucero] were living together," defendant responded 
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affirmatively: "Yes.". . . "That was when I first got released from prison." Id. Defendant 
subsequently explained that he served prison time for distributing marijuana. R495:162, add. 
C. On cross examination, the prosecutor elicited that defendant had been "convicted of three 
counts of distribution of a controlled substance," and "one count with a possession of 
controlled] substance with the intent to distribute," or "four counts altogether." R495:167, 
add. C. 
The prosecutor briefly mentioned defendant's felony convictions in closing argument 
to explain how Officer Machielson gathered information for the search warrant affidavit: 
"What else does he do? He checks out [defendant's] prior criminal history and finds out that 
the defendant does have a history. He's been convicted before of distributing a controlled 
substance. Also, possession with intent and was convicted by a jury back in 1993." R496:49, 
add. C. 
Defense counsel also referred to the felonies during closing argument, asserting that 
defendant's forthrightness added to his credibility: "He's (defendant) the one that said over 
ten years ago, yes, he was involved in drugs and served some prison time for it. That only 
gave him credibility when he says am I going to jeopardize that with drug testing now." 
R496:123, add. C. 
Waiver. A defendant, as here, who preemptively introduces prior convictions on 
direct examination may not challenge their admission on appeal. SeeOhler v. United States, 
529 U.S. 753, 755-760 (2000). Ohler, like defendant, was charged with drug distribution. 
529 U.S. at 755. The government moved in limine to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction 
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as character evidence under federal rule 404(b), and as impeachment evidence under federal 
rule 609(a)(1). Id. The district court denied the government's motion to admit Ohler's 
felony conviction under rule 404(b), but ruled that if Ohler testified it could be used to 
impeach her under 609(a)(1). Id. Ohler subsequently testified and admitted on direct 
examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine. Id. 
On appeal, Ohler challenged the district court's in limine ruling allowing the 
government to impeach her with the felony. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court, holding that Ohler waived any objection when she introduced the 
conviction during her direct examination. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in 
turn, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court reaffirmed that "[generally, a party introducing 
evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted." Id. The 
Court also specifically rejected Ohler's argument that "it would be unfair to apply such a 
waiver rule [in her case] because it compels a defendant to forgo the tactical advantage of 
preemptively introducing the conviction in order to appeal the in limine ruling." Id. at 757. 
Rather, the supreme court observed that "both the [government and the defendant in a 
criminal trial must make choices as the trial progresses." Id. A defendant, for example, must 
decide whether to testify and risk impeachment, and if she chooses to testify, she must further 
choose "whether to introduce [a prior] conviction on direct examination and remove the sting 
or to take her chances with the prosecutor's possible elicitation of the conviction on cross-
examination." Id. at 758. 
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The government, on the other hand, must, "[i]f the defendant testifies, . . . choose 
whether or not to impeach her by use of her prior conviction." Id. Even though the district 
court in Ohler "indicated he would allow" the prior conviction to come in, the government 
"still had to consider whether its use might be deemed reversible error on appeal." Id. 
According to the Court, "[t]his choice is often based on the [government's appraisal of the 
apparent effect of the defendant's testimony. If she has offered a plausible, innocent 
explanation of the evidence against her, it will be inclined to use the prior conviction; if not, 
it may decide not to risk possible reversal on appeal from its use." Id. Thus, Ohler's position 
would effectively deprive the [government of its "usual right to decide," after the defendant 
testifies, "whether or not to use [any] prior conviction[s] against her." Id. In short, Ohler 
sought to "short circuit" the "decisional process by offering the conviction herself (and 
thereby removing the sting) and still preserve its admission as a claim of error on appeal." 
Id. The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that "[o]nly when the [government exercises 
its option to elicit the testimony is an appellate court confronted with a case where, under the 
normal rules of trial, the defendant can claim the denial of a substantial right if in fact the 
district court's in limine ruling proved to be erroneous." Id. at 759. Thus, "there [was] 
nothing 'unfair,'... about putting [Ohler] to her choice in accordance with the normal rules 
of trial." Id. 
Moreover, in limine rulings are by nature non-binding, "and the judge may always 
change his mind during the course of a trial." Id. at 758 n.3. "Ohler's position, therefore, 
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[also] deprive[d] the trial court of the opportunity to change its mind after hearing all of the 
defendant's testimony." Id. 
Finally, the Court rejected Ohler's claim that applying waiver under these 
circumstances "unconstitutionally burdenfed] her right to testify." Id. at 759. To the 
contrary, Ohler and any defendant could still testify, although subject to cross-examination 
and impeachment by the use of a prior felony conviction. Id. "[I]t is not thought inconsistent 
with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such 
pros and cons in deciding whether to testify." Id. at 759-760 (quoting McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)). 
Here, the State successfully sought an in limine ruling that it could use defendant's 
prior conviction in its case-in-chief under rule 404(b). See R484:47. In Ohler, the 
government succeeded in obtaining an in limine ruling allowing Ohler's conviction to be 
used for impeachment purposes. 529 U.S. at 755. Thus, heading into trial the State here was 
in an arguably better position than the government in Ohler because the State was authorized 
to use defendant's convictions in its case-in-chief, while the government would have had to 
wait to impeach Ohler if she testified. Id. Had the State here taken advantage of its 
favorable in limine ruling and introduced defendant's convictions during its case-in-chief, 
defendant could have challenged the in limine ruling. However, despite having obtained the 
favorable in limine ruling, the State chose not act on it. Accordingly, because the State had 
not introduced defendant's felony convictions by the time it rested, defendant stood in 
effectively the same position as did Ohler after the government rested. Given the in limine 
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rulings in both cases, both Ohler and defendant knew they faced near certain impeachment 
with a prior conviction if they testified. Defendant here knew that the trial court was at least 
pre-disposed to allow rule 609 impeachment if he testified, given the unfavorable (and 
unused) rule 404(b) in limine ruling. Nonetheless, Ohler and defendant both chose to testify, 
and having made that decision, both further chose to preemptively introduce their prior 
convictions during direct examination, rather than await impeachment on cross-examination. 
Thus, like Ohler, defendant himself, not the State, introduced his prior convictions. 
Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the result in Ohler and this case. The 
Ohler rule properly applies here. Just as Ohler was precluded from challenging the 
admission of the conviction she introduced, defendant is similarly precluded. 
* * * 
District Court's Ruling. Even assuming the Court were to overlook that defendant, 
not the State, introduced the prior conviction evidence about which defendant complains on 
appeal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant' s felony distribution 
convictions were admissible under rule 404(b). R484:39-48. SeeStatev.Decorso, 1999 UT 
5 7 , t l 8, 993P.2d837. 
Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]" Further, 
this Court has held that rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion which admits evidence of a 
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defendant's prior bad acts if they are relevant for a non-character purpose, under rule 402, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
SeeDecorso, 1999 UT 57, ffif 12, 23-24. 
Here, the trial court ruled in limine that defendant's convictions were probative of at 
least defendant's intent and knowledge, see R484:43-48, add. C, but because defendant 
disputed that he sold the drugs to Hartley and similarly denied that the contraband found in 
the condo belonged to him, see id,, his prior distributing convictions are arguably highly 
probative of another enumerated rule 404(b) category: identity. Thus, identity is an 
additional or alternative ground for affirming the trial court's rule 404(b) admissibility ruling, 
which is "readily supported by the record and fully consistent with the trial court's ruling." 
State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, If 10, 69 P.3d 293.3 
As noted above, defendant's identity as the dealer and his possession of the 
contraband was a contested issue in this case. During the pretrial hearing, trial counsel 
3
 "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgement appealed from 
cif it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling 
or action . . .'" State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, If 10, 52 P.3d 1158, in turn quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 
f 18, 29 P.3d 1225) (additional citations omitted)); see also Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass \ 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969). The 
alternative theory "must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court." 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 9. See also State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,117, 994 P.2d 
1278 (affirming search as incident to arrest although district court found an inventory 
search). 
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asserted that the State could not prove that defendant resided with Lori in the condo where 
the controlled buys occurred and the contraband was found. R484:39-47, add. C. This 
dispute became even clearer at trial. Trial counsel's opening statement theorized that 
defendant was framed by Hartley, that he did not live in the condo, and that others had more 
access to the condo than he did. See, e.g., R493:151-158. Moreover, defendant's cross-
examination brought out Hartley's dislike for defendant, that he didn't like having defendant 
living in the condominium complex, and that if doing a controlled buy could get defendant 
out of the complex, he was willing to do it. R493:240-242. As a witness for the State, Lori 
testified that while defendant lived with her from 1996 to 2000 and still kept things at the 
condo, including $1450 cash under the mattress, he did not live there when the search 
warrant was executed. R494:25-28. Lori's testimony was contrary to her initial statement 
to Officer McGuire, that defendant was her "live-in boyfriend," and that defendant had sold 
drugs from the condo. See, e.g., R494:48. When confronted with a taped conversation 
between herself and defendant, Lori admitted that defendant told her, "You have to testify 
that [I] never, ever, ever lived there." R494:32. During his own cross-examination, 
defendant admitted telling Lori to testify that he never lived there, but maintained that he did 
so because it was the truth. R495:175. Because defendant's identity as the dealer who made 
the controlled buys from the condo and possessed the drugs stored there was at issue, the trial 
court correctly ruled that his distributing convictions were probative of a non-character 
purpose and admissible under rule 404(b). See R484:47, add. C. See Taylor, 818P.2dat568 
(upholding admission of evidence that defendant possessed "substantial amounts of 
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identically packaged manjuana only twelve days prior" because it was "highly probative of 
[defendant's] constructive possession of the marijuana" at issue). See also State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, t 24, 29, 52 P.3d 1194 (upholding evidence of defendant's 
"consensual sexual activities involving [] whips and straps" where child murder victim's 
bruising "was consistent with the manner in which [defendant] used the whips and straps"; 
thus, the evidence was "admissible for the non-character purpose of proving identity"). 
Nevertheless, defendant complains that his convictions were inadmissible for any rule 
404(b) purpose because they were too dissimilar and remote. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. The alleged 
dissimilarities defendant relied on below were that his prior convictions involved distributing 
from his residence (he denied living at the condo where the controlled buys occurred here), 
and that he previously distributed only marijuana (the instant charges were for meth in 
addition to marijuana). R484:39-47, add. C. These are not meaningful distinctions and were 
properly rejected by the trial court. 
Because the State theorized that the evidence would show that defendant did live in 
and distribute from the condo, defendant's attempted distinction was of no effect. Id. To 
support his claim of dissimilarity on appeal, defendant cites "primarily [] cases involving 
sexual assault and rape where appellate courts often refused to admit evidence of prior 
crimes," because the evidence is often "not sufficiently probative of a material issue and its 
potential for prejudice [] great." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570 n.6 (discussing eg., State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) and State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1990), both 
relied upon by defendant here, see Aplt. Br. at 17). However, this Court recognized in 
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Taylor, that "federal courts have routinely admitted evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) in drug prosecutions." 818 P.2d at 569-570 (collecting cases) 
(rejecting Taylor's claim that evidence of his prior possession was not probative of his 
constructive possession of marijuana). 
Nor were defendant's then eight-and-half-year-old convictions too remote. See 
R484:40. "While there is no bright line for determining whether an act is too remote, courts 
tend to analogize to the 10 year time limit contained in Rule 609(b) governing impeachment 
by evidence of conviction of a crime." See Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982, 988 (Del. 1994) 
(questioning admission of "[a]n act committed 12 years earlier). Compare Trujillo v. State, 
2 P.3d 567, 571-572 (Wyo. 2000) (upholding admission of defendant's prior drug dealing 
approximately 6-7 years earlier). Defendant's eight-and-a-half-year old convictions fall on 
the admissible side of the 10-year rule of thumb. Moreover, as pointed out by the prosecutor 
below, defendant spent much of the intervening eight and a half years in prison, "so that 
lessens the time after he was released from those, your Honor, from when he committed these 
new offenses." See R484:40, add. C. 
While the trial court did not expressly invoke rules 402 and 403, of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, it implicitly found that evidence of defendant's prior convictions was relevant and 
probative, or not unfairly prejudicial. See R484:39-48, add. C. Relevant evidence is 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[B]ecause the standard for determining whether evidence 
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is relevant is so low, the issue of whether evidence is relevant is rarely an issue." State v. 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f^ 13, 973 P.2d 404. Under rule 403, relevant evidence can be excluded 
only if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
Here, defendant's drug distribution convictions were relevant to the State's theory, 
that of all the people with access to the condo, defendant was the one who sold marijuana and 
meth to Hartley on three different occasions, and also possessed the marijuana, meth, and 
paraphernalia found therein. And evidence of defendant's prior convictions was not unfairly 
prejudicial because the convictions probative of at least his disputed identity as the 
possessor/distributor of the contraband and not just "[his] proclivity to commit the crime 
charged." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 32. See State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 
App. 1994) (upholding admission of defendant's prior acts of child abuse where she "denied 
being the perpetrator," and "raised identity as an issue when she argued, in opposition to the 
State's motion in limine, that she had two teenage daughters in the home who could have 
caused [the victim's] injuries"). 
Indeed, the State presented evidence that defendant lived in the condo and distributed 
drugs therefrom. See, e.g., R493:161-162, 174, 177, 179; R494:32, 48-52, 100, 121, 242. 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he kept some things in the condo (including the 
$1450 cash), but was living out of his tile shop. R495:144. To that end, defendant called at 
least four friends who testified similarly. See, e.g., R495:63,130,135,200. Another friend 
testified that defendant worked at her house on 9 February 2001, the date of the first 
controlled buy. R495:19-25. Thus, the defendant's prior convictions were relevant and 
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probative of the disputed issue of whether he was the one that actually possessed the drugs 
and distributed marijuana and meth to Hartley. Finally, as argued by the prosecutor, and 
recognized in Taylor, 818 P.2d at 569-570 n.6, prior drug crimes are regularly admitted in 
drug cases precisely because they are less likely than prior sexual offenses to unfairly 
prejudice the jury. Rl 16-117. 
No Prejudice. In any event, even assuming the trial court erred in ruling in limine that 
the State could introduce evidence of defendant's prior convictions in its case-in-chief, 
defendant suffered no prejudice. First, the State did not act on the in limine ruling. Rather, 
it was defendant who introduced his prior convictions, after the State had rested, during his 
own direct examination. R495:143, 162, add. C. On cross-examination, the State merely 
clarified that defendant had four prior distributing related convictions. R495:167, add. C. 
The evidence was not emphasized in the State's closing argument, but was referenced merely 
to explain the steps Officer Machielson took to corroborate Hartley's information that 
defendant was involved in distributing drugs. See R496:49, add. C. 
Second, defendant used the convictions to his advantage when trial counsel argued 
that defendant was forthright with the jury. R496:123, add. C. 
Finally, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Hartley successfully 
completed three controlled buys with defendant which were overhead by police via an 
electronic transmitter. See, e.g., R494:104-119. Officer Machielson overheard Hartley's 
negotiations and determined that the distinctive voice he overheard conversing with Hartley 
was the same as defendant's. See R494:116, 247. Moreover, a $100 bill given to Hartley 
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by the strike force to purchase meth from defendant during the third controlled buy was 
recovered from underneath a mattress in defendant' s condo along with $ 13 50 additional cash 
which defendant admitted was his. R494:126; R495:180. Lori initially told police that 
defendant dealt drugs from their condo and only changed her story when defendant asked her 
to deny that he lived in the apartment. R494:29, 48-49. Defendant also initially reported to 
Officer Machielson that he lived at the Canyon Road condo. R494:151. Given this sampling 
of the evidence against defendant, the jury did not convict him merely because he forthrightly 
admitted distributing marijuana in the past. "[A]n appellate court will not overturn a jury 
verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the admission of the evidence did not 
reasonably effect the likelihood of a different verdict." See State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 
118,126,62 P.3d 444 (holding that given "the evidence of drug use and possession already 
properly in the record, the suggestion that defendant had attempted to obtain drugs, once 
upon a time, would come as little surprise to the jury, and would do little to prejudice the jury 
against him"). 
The jury verdict should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED PROBABLE 
CAUSE BECAUSE IT SET FORTH THAT POLICE 
ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
WHO WENT TO DEFENDANT'S CONDO AND BOUGHT 
MARIJUANA AND METHAMPHETAMINE FROM HIM ON THREE 
DIFFERENT OCCASIONS 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his 
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant-supported search of the Canyon 
Road condo. Aplt. Br. at 22-28. According to defendant, the trial court should have 
suppressed the evidence because the affiant, Officer Machielson, mislabeled as an 
"intelligence report," an "undated, uncorroborated, anonymous report," that defendant "was 
involved with 154 pounds of marijuana that was found in a storage shed in Riverdale." Aplt. 
Br. at 23-24. Additionally, defendant claims that Officer Machielson included the 
"intelligence report" in the affidavit even though, according to defendant, Officer Machielson 
"apparently knew that [djefendant was not a suspect" in the Riverdale case. See Aplt. Br. 
at 23-25. The trial court properly recognized that whether the report was labeled 
"anonymous" or "intelligence," or even included in the affidavit at all, the affidavit set forth 
probable cause to search and accordingly rejected defendant's claims. 
Proceedings Below. Defendant moved to suppress the narcotics seized from 
defendant's condo, alleging that Officer Machielson's inclusion of the baseless "intelligence 
report" in the search warrant affidavit misled the magistrate and necessarily tainted the other 
corroborative information in the affidavit, specifically, the three controlled buys. Rl 84-191. 
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The State filed a written opposition to the motion. R200-208. The prosecutor pointed out 
that the "intelligence report was only the starting point" of the affidavit, and served merely 
to "pinpoint defendant as a possible suspect. When the CI came forward and indicated that 
controlled substances could be purchased from defendant, that further corroborated the 
original report." R202. Therefore, Officer Machielson "did not deliberately or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, mislead [the magistrate]." R205 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 43 8 U.S. 
154, 171 (1978)). 
Defendant called Officer Machielson to testify at the motion to suppress hearing on 
10 July 2002. See R490 (a copy of the hearing transcript is attached in addendum B). 
Officer Machielson's direct examination established no more than that he did not charge 
defendant in the Riverdale case referenced in the "intelligence report," that Hartley told him 
defendant was a meth user, and that he overheard Hartley and defendant discussing drugs 
when he electronically monitored the three controlled buys. See R490:4-9, add. B. No other 
witnesses were called. 
During trial counsel's oral argument, the trial court elicited that trial counsel was not 
claiming that Officer Machielson planted the evidence seized from defendant's condo, nor 
was he disputing that the controlled buys occurred. R490:23-24, 28, add. B. Rather, trial 
counsel's complaint was that the controlled buys were "orchestrated rather than just a buy 
that took place." R490:28, add. B. 
32 
Following the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion in an oral ruling. 
R490:31-32, add. B. Noting that a signed search warrant is presumed to be valid, the trial 
court ruled that the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause: 
. . . [M]ost significant, is the fact that the police are able to have a 
confidential informant go in, make three different purchases from the 
defendant at Canyon Road, number—apartment number 2. They indicated that 
they monitored and listened in on conversations and transactions. They 
watched the transaction. There was one in February of 2001, a second buy 
also in February of 2001 at the same address, and a third buy involving 
methamphetamine which took place within 24 hours of the search warrant 
being issued, again, at that same address involving the same defendant. Again, 
it was monitored by the police. 
So I think—in addition to that they indicated what was reliable about 
the confidential informant, that he' d given information to the police in the past. 
Those—the information of the confidential informant had led to several arrests 
and convictions for drug offenses. 
He indicated that he was a former drug user himself and he was familiar 
with the procedure for selling of drugs and he had no cases pending at the 
time. 
So I just think the fact that the CI went in under police control on three 
different occasions to make buys from the defendant certainly would establish 
probable cause by itself to authorize the issuance of the search warrant. So 
based on that, the Court will deny the motion. 
R490:31-32, add. B. 
This Case. On appeal, defendant renews his allegation that Officer Machielson "knew 
that the defendant wasn't a suspect in that case," but "included the information in the 
affidavit and called it an 'intelligence report' instead of what it was which was an 
uncorroborated anonymous tip." Aplt. Br. at 26. 
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In Utah "a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity of 
a search warrant if the defendant can establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit supporting a 
search warrant made a false statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, and (ii) the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause after 
the misstatement is set aside." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah) (citing Franks, 43 8 
U.S. at 171-172), cert, denied 480 U.S. 930 (1987). The Franks doctrine also applies "when 
a misstatement occurs because information is omitted." Id. Accordingly, "[i]f an affidavit 
fails to support a finding of probable cause after the false statements are excised or the 
omitted information is added, i.e., if the omission or misstatement materially affects the 
finding of probable cause, any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must 
be suppressed." Id. 
Turning to the first prong of the Franks/Nielsen test which requires a showing of 
intentional falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, defendant failed to make that 
showing below. The trial court implicitly rejected defendant's challenge to Officer 
Machielson's credibility. See R490:23-24, 28, 31-32, add. B. The trial court could not rule 
otherwise, as defendant presented no evidence to support his claim of false and deliberate 
conduct on the part of Officer Machielson in preparing the affidavit. See R490:4-9, 23-24, 
28, add. B. See also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah App. 1987) (rejecting 
claimed Franks violation where defendant "offered no evidence that [the detective] 
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth included any allegedly false information 
in the affidavit"). The most that defendant established was that prior to receiving the tip, 
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Officer Machielson had not suspected defendant had any level of involvement in the 
Riverdale case. R490:4-9, add. B. This evidence offers little if any support for defendant's 
allegation that Officer Machielson knew that the "intelligence report" was false and so 
knowing, deliberately included it in the affidavit. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to establish the first prong of the Franks/Nielsen 
test below, the trial also considered the second prong of the test which requires the challenger 
to establish that if the misstatement is set aside, the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause. Nielsen, 727 P.3d at 191 (quotation omitted). The trial court 
found that the second prong was also unmet when it found that the "heart of the affidavit" 
was the paragraph setting forth the three controlled buys conducted at defendant's condo. 
R490:20, 31-32, add. B. As found by the trial court, the controlled buys were themselves 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search, with or without the "intelligence report." 
R490:32, add. B. Thus, even if the information regarding defendant's alleged involvement 
in the Riverdale case could have been more artfully presented in the affidavit, or even 
omitted altogether, the magistrate's—and the trial court's—probable cause determination 
stands independent of that information. See Miller, 740 P.2d at 1367 (upholding probable 
cause determination where "[e]ven if the few allegedly false statements were removed, the 
remaining information clearly established the requisite probable cause).4 
defendant's claims that the affidavit failed to accurately characterize Hartley's 
experience and compensation are raised for the first time on appeal. Compare Aplt. Br. at 
26 and Rl 81-191. They are therefore unpreserved, and in the absence of a plain error or 
ineffective assistance claim, they are also procedurally barred. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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Based on the above, defendant's challenge to the search warrant affidavit lacks merit 
and should therefore be rejected. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF ERROR 
UNDER RULE 608(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, WHEN HE LED 
THE TRIAL COURT TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NO 
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT EMBEZZLEMENT 
WAS PROBATIVE OF TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow Hartley to be cross-examined about his alleged theft from his (Hartley's) 
former employer under rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 28-33. The trial 
court observed that theft crimes do not necessarily "equate with dishonesty/' under analogous 
rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, and therefore, "just because he's been fired for 
embezzlement may not necessarily mean he's untruthful[.]" R493:280-281 (copies of the 
pertinent transcript pages are attached in addendum D). The trial court thus initially denied 
defendant's request to cross-examine Hartley about the alleged theft. However, it offered 
to reconsider, stating that if defendant provided a case "that says firing somebody for 
embezzlement constitutes untruthfulness, I'll certainly take a look at it and reconsider." 
R493:282, add. D. Defendant failed to later provide any such authority or to request 
reconsideration. Thus, he effectively communicated to the trial court that no such authority 
existed. His claim of error is affirmatively waived. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, Iffl 
12, 16, 61 P.3d 1062 (State's affirmative waiver argument "well taken," where trial court 
invited defendant to make a later objection, if necessary, and defendant failed to do so). 
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In any event, despite the trial court's ruling, defendant himself testified that Hartley 
was fired for stealing from his former employer. R495:153-154, add. D. Thus, even 
overlooking defendant's affirmative waiver, the jury heard the very evidence defendant 
claims he was precluded from eliciting. 
Proceedings Below. During Hartley's cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
where he was "currently employed," and Hartley refused to answer. R493:237. The 
prosecutor objected to questions "about this." Id. When the trial court asked why this line 
of inquiry was relevant, trial counsel said it went "directly to his honesty and—and his 
character." Id. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection after an unrecorded bench 
conference. Id. 
After the jury was excused for the evening, trial counsel requested to make a record 
on whether "we could ask on cross-examination Mr. Hartley regarding specific acts of 
dishonesty." R493:269, 276, add. D. Trial counsel argued that while rule 609 allowed 
admission of felonies and misdemeanors involving an act of dishonesty, rule 608(b) allowed 
for cross-examination regarding the "acts that underlie a conviction or underlie a criminal 
investigationf.]" R493:277, add. D. When the trial court responded that Hartley had not been 
charged with a crime, trial counsel replied that Hartley "was charged with the theft and 
there's a plea in abeyance in effect. So the status of the case is still pending." Id. 
The trial court pointed out that because Hartley had entered a plea in abeyance, "there 
is no conviction." Id. Trial counsel suggested that he could still ask about the underlying 
facts "as long as we avoid any type of a mention of a criminal case." R493:277-279, add. D. 
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When the trial court asked how trial counsel proposed doing that, trial counsel said by 
"simply ask[ing] him if he ever—why he was laid off from—from Wheelwrights . .. [w]ith 
an admonition to him by the State that he not mention anything regarding a criminal case." 
R493:279, add. D. The trial court then asked what trial counsel would do if Hartley "denie[d] 
that he was fired for embezzling funds[?]" Id. Trial counsel responded, "Then we can't do 
anything more. Not with him." Id. 
When the trial court asked trial counsel if the term "dishonesty" as used in rule 609 
meant the same thing as the terms "truthfulness or untruthfulness" as used in rule 608(b), trial 
counsel responded, "not necessarily." R493:280, add. D. The trial court replied that case law 
interpreting rule 609 "said just because you've been convicted of a theft doesn't equate with 
dishonesty." Id. Trial counsel agreed, but argued that "you need to take a look at the facts 
underlying it." R493:280-281, add. D. The trial court observed that "just because he's been 
fired for embezzlement may not necessarily mean he's untruthful[.]" Trial counsel then 
paraphrased the police report: 
Mr. Hartley was working . . . for Wheelwright Lumber.... He assisted 
people in getting lumber from the back of the lumber yard, loading it into their 
vehicles, taking it to their home, and then doing construction work on their 
home with the materials that was obtained there. He did it without repaying 
Wheelwright Lumber for the things that were taken out of the back of their 
yard, without notifying them that he was doing that work for these people on 
their homes. 
When confronted with it, he said, "Oh, yes, I have receipts, I simply 
can't find them." Denied, denied, denied, several times. And then finally 
when he was confronted with what they had been told by the people that he'd 
done work for them, he finally confessed and said, "Yes, I did it, just give me 
a chance to pay you back." 
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R493:281-282, add. D. Trial counsel argued that Hartley's conduct amounted to "specific 
instances of untruthfulness there: Number one, being untruthful to the person that he was 
getting the lumber for and doing the projects for; [and] number two, being untruthful to his 
employer in whether or not he'd done it." R493:282, add. D. 
The trial court disagreed: 
Welly I guess if you want to find a case for me that's right on point that 
says firing somebody for embezzlement constitutes untruthfulness, I'll certainly 
take a look at it and reconsider in the morning. But as it sits right now, I'm 
just not inclined to grant it. I mean, otherwise it makes such a mockery out of 
this system that says look, the only way you can attack is with convictions and 
they've either got to be felonies or they have to involve acts of dishonesty. I 
mean, I think it's fairly clear from the rules that we—we're very strict about 
attacking with specific instances. . . . And that's what this is. You're—you 
want to be able to ask him why he was fired from his employment and yet 
there [is] no conviction. Had he been convicted, it would be a lot easier. . . . 
But he hasn't been. It's a plea in abeyance[]. 
R493:282-283, add. D (emphasis added). When trial counsel argued that rule 608(b) was not 
as narrow as rule 609, the trial court responded that "when we get down to specific conduct 
under [608](b), I think it's very narrow about what specific conduct you can go into I'm 
just trying to figure out what the ramification is if he comes in and enters a plea in abeyance 
and there's no conviction, how can we then circumvent that and say well, it falls under [rule] 
608(b)?" R493:283-284, add. D. The trial court then reiterated its conditional ruling: 
I'll take it under advisement for the time being. I mean, initially I think I've 
denied it, but if you want to take a look and see if there's any case law out 
there, I'll certainly reconsider the issue. But as it stands right now, I'm just 
not inclined to let you go into that. 
R493:285, add. D. 
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Defendant never acted on the trial court's invitation; rather, during his direct 
examination, defendant testified that Hartley was fired for stealing. R495:153-154, add. D. 
This is the very type of extrinsic impeachment evidence that rule 608(b) forbids. 
Following his jury conviction, defendant moved for a new trial asserting, among other 
things, that he had discovered "new evidence that could not be discovered prior to or during 
the time of trial.", R410. The new evidence was that a conviction for theft was entered against 
Hartley in August 2001. Id. Although defendant's new trial motion did not expressly refer 
to rule 609(a)(2), he used the language of that rule in arguing for the admissibility of 
Hartley's conviction. See R411 ("Such evidence was not cumulative, because there was no 
evidence of criminal convictions of Mr. Hartley involving dishonesty or false statement 
entered into evidence"). The prosecutor responded that Hartley's conviction was actually 
entered on 22 August 2002. R426. Thus, because the conviction was not entered until two 
days after the conclusion of defendant's trial, Hartley could not have been impeached "with 
a conviction that had not happened yet." Id. Finally, the prosecutor pointed out that "despite 
rulings from [the trial court] to the contrary," defendant "told [the] jury that Mr. Hartley had 
lost his job for stealing from Wheelwright Lumber." Id. 
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, finding that "[a]t the time that he testified, 
Mr. Hartley had not been convicted of the misdemeanor theft. The fact that Mr. Hartley was 
convicted of a misdemeanor theft after his testimony in this case does not provide a basis for 
a new trial." R506 (a copy of the trial court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law is attached in addendum E). The trial court further found that even though it had "ruled 
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that the allegation that Mr. Hartley had been fired from his employment for theft, was not 
admissible," "defendant told the [j]ury a t trial that Mr. Hartley had been fired for theft. The 
[j]ury was well aware of that fact, even though inadmissible, and any [further] evidence 
concerning it would not have had, and did not have an effect on the [jjury's verdict." Id. 
Affirmative Waiver. On appeal, defendant does not raise the rule 609 issue he 
asserted in his new trial motion, that Hartley's post-trial conviction constituted new 
impeachment evidence. See R410-411. Rather, he asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow Hartley to be cross-examined about his firing under rule 
608(b). Aplt. Br. at 28-33. For reasons set forth below, defendant's rule 608(b) claim is 
affirmatively waived. 
Rule 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . 
The trial court reasonably analogized to rule 609(a)(2) in ruling on defendant's request to 
cross-examine Hartley under rule 608(b), recognizing that if theft was not probative of 
"dishonesty" for purposes of impeachment under rule 609, see State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 
655-656 (Utah 1989), it was not likely probative of "truthfulness or untruthfulness" for 
purposes of impeachment under rule 608(b).5 R493:282-283,285, add. D. As there is barely 
5Rule 609(a)(2) provides that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness,. . . evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
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a semantical difference between the term "dishonesty" as used in rule 609 and the term 
"untruthfulness" as used in rule 608(b), the trial court's analogy was sound. 
Nevertheless, the trial court offered to reconsider its initial ruling denying defendant's 
request to cross-examine Hartley regarding his firing, if defendant could provide any 
authority indicating that embezzlement was a crime of "untruthfulness." R493:283, add. D. 
Defendant provided no such authority. Defendant's inaction, in light of the trial court's 
invitation to reconsider its ruling, amounts to an affirmative waiver of his rule 608(b) claim: 
in not accepting the invitation to provide supporting authority for his claim that 
embezzlement was a crime of untruthfulness, defendant effectively communicated to the trial 
court that no such authority exists. See Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ^ f 12, 16. "Just as where an 
issue has not yet been raised, when a court properly defers ruling," or, as here, offers to 
reconsider a ruling, "'the court[] [is] not [then] required to constantly survey or second-guess 
[that] party's best interests or trial strategy.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 114, \ 16 (quoting State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996)). "Rather, the requirement of a timely objection to 
preserve the issue for review is renewed under the terms set forth by the trial court." Id. 
Where, as here, a party fails to act on an invitation to reconsider by presenting pertinent 
authority, "the party has not 'presented [the issue] to the trial court in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon' thereby preserving the issue for review." Id. (quoting Buehner Block 
Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894 n.2 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, defendant's claim of 
error under rule 608(b) is foreclosed. 
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." 
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No prejudice. Even overlooking defendant's affirmative waiver, if the trial court can 
fairly be said to have abused its broad discretion in disallowing the requested cross-
examination of Hartley here, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice. Although he was unable 
to cross-examine Hartley about the circumstances of his firing, defendant himself testified 
that Hartley lost his job for stealing. R495:153-154, add. D. Thus, the jury ultimately heard 
the evidence that defendant claims he was erroneously denied an opportunity to elicit. See 
R506, add. E (denying defendant's new trial motion in part because the "[j]ury was well 
aware" Hartley "had been fired from his employment for theft"). 
Moreover, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Hartley's identification 
of defendant as the distributor/dealer was corroborated by Officer Machielson, who 
overheard all three controlled transactions and recognized the distributor/dealer's voice as 
belonging to defendant. R493:170-180; R494:104-119. Defendant himself admitted to 
keeping some of his things at the condo, including the $1450 cash found under the mattress, 
which cash included the $ 100 bill used in the third controlled buy. R494:128-129; R495:145, 
180. And, Lori and defendant both initially told police that he lived at the condo, and Lori 
additionally initially reported that defendant dealt drugs from the condo. R494:48-49,151. 
Based on all of the above, defendant fails to show any probability that Hartley's alleged theft, 
even if admitted by Hartley under cross-examination, would have resulted in a different 
outcome here. See R507, add. E (denying defendant's new trial motion, in part, because 
evidence of Hartley's firing for theft had had no effect on the jury verdict). See State v. 
Rammel, 111 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986) (erroneous limitation on cross-examination as to 
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victim's possible motive in testifying held non-prejudicial "because additional cross-
examination would not have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict"). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON 
NEWLY DISCOVERED IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE THAT 
HARTLEY HAD PREVIOUSLY USED COCAINE 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for new trial based, in part, on newly discovered evidence that Hartley 
had previously used cocaine. Aplt. Br. at 33-36. The trial court properly ruled that because 
Hartley's testimony "was corroborated by the other evidence in this case, the totality of the 
evidence, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified," there was no reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome. R507, add. E. 
Hartley's Trial Testimony. On direct examination, Hartley admitted that he used to 
hang out with defendant occasionally and "smoke some weed," or marijuana. R493:163-164. 
While he "had been a user of controlled substance previously," Hartley told the jury that he 
quit on 11 November 2000: "I was just smoking a lot of weed and it just—I mean, it was 
killing my lungs, you know, and I just—I was just sick of waking up and hacking and 
coughing and just pretty much sick of that life, that lifestyle, you know, being around those 
type of people." R493:168. On cross-examination, Hartley acknowledged that he was "drug 
activated with [defendant] for probably about two years, maybe a year." R493:207. Hartley 
also responded affirmatively when trial counsel asked if he had stopped used drugs in 
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November of 2000, "just several months before [he] became a paid informant." R493:207-
208. When trial counsel asked if Hartley had just stopped using marijuana only "or did you 
stop using—. . . Illegal drugs," Hartley interjected, "Everything," and then expounded, 
"That's all I did was marijuana." R493:211. 
New Trial Motion. Following the jury verdict, defendant moved for a new trial 
alleging, among other things, that the prosecutor had knowingly allowed Hartley to testify 
falsely about the number of drugs he used and the date he stopped using them. R409-410. 
Specifically, defendant referred to "a preliminary hearing held on August 29, 2001, in the 
case of State v. Kim Ray Teeter, Case No. 011901690," which similarly involved Hartley as 
a confidential informant, Officer Machielson as "the State's Narcotics Agent," and the same 
prosecutor as here. Id. At that hearing, "Hartley testified, under oath, that he had not only 
used marijuana, but that he was also still actively using cocaine until the first week of 
December 2000." R409 (emphasis in original). While defendant cited to specific pages of 
the Teeter transcript, he did not attach them to his motion. Hartley's alleged testimony in the 
Teeter case, defendant argued, contrasted with Hartley's testimony here, "that the only drug 
he ever used was marijuana, and that he quit using marijuana on November 11, 2000." Id. 
(emphasis in original) (citing R493:168, 210-211). 
Defendant further asserted that Hartley's trial testimony had been "the only real link 
between [defendant and the drugs found at 1120 Canyon Road, #2, Ogden, Utah[.]" R410. 
Moreover, defendant asserted, one of the jurors had indicated during voir dire, that "if hard 
drugs, such as methamphetamine, were involved in the case it would affect his opinion." 
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R410 (citing R493:77-78, 84-85).6 Thus, defendant opined that had Hartley testified 
truthfully about his use of "hard drugs, there is a reasonable likelihood his credibility with 
the jury could have been affected, and that his loss of credibility with the jury could have 
affected the judgement of the jury." Id, 
The prosecutor opposed the new trial motion on the grounds that, contrary to trial 
counsel's assertion, he had no personal knowledge of Hartley's drug use and no recollection 
of Hartley's testimony in the Teeter case. R423. Further, Hartley was never specifically 
asked if the only drug he ever used was marijuana and the State had never argued that 
Hartley only used marijuana, or was somehow more trustworthy because he only used 
marijuana. R424. More importantly, there was no evidence Hartley used drugs during the 
time he worked as a confidential informant in this case. R424-425. Finally, the State never 
denied that Hartley had a "connection with the drug community and that he had received 
drugs from and used drugs with defendant" in the past. R425-426. The prosecutor 
accordingly concluded that evidence of Hartley's cocaine use was not "central" to the case 
and there was "no reasonable likelihood" of a different outcome, even if the jury had "heard 
that Mr. Hartley used cocaine in [the] months prior to this transaction." R424, 426. 
Following the parties' oral arguments on 29 January 2003, see R513, the trial court 
denied the new trial motion: 
As you know, in order to grant a motion for a new trial there has to be 
a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would be different. And, frankly, 
6The juror was ultimately excused. See R374 (Juror List). 
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after hearing the argument and looking at the memorandums, I just don't think 
that the—that there's a reasonable likelihood here that the outcome would be 
any different if we granted a new trial. . . . 
When you talk about some of the issues here that you've raised about 
the CI, I don't think there's any question that everybody in this courtroom 
knew that the confidential informant had used drugs. But I don't recall 
anybody really pressing him about the type of drug that he was using, whether 
it was marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, but it was clear that he was a 
drug user at one point. 
I'm just not sure that it makes any difference in this case as to how 
many different types of drugs he was using. He admitted on the stand that 
he'd used drugs in the past, he had a drug problem. In fact, my recollection 
was that that's the reason he came forward. That's the reason he contacted law 
enforcement is he felt like he had some responsibility to try to help correct the 
problem, to get rid of the people who were selling drugs and using drugs. And 
he just felt like it was his turn and his time to come forward and try to do this. 
And so I just—I don't know that that really affects his credibility as to 
how many different types of drugs he was using, and I just don't remember 
anybody really pressing him hard as to the type of drug he was using. 
R499:2-3, add. E. See also R505-507, add. E. 
Failure to Marshal. The trial court implicitly rejected defendant's claims of a 
discovery violation below. R499:l-4, add. E; R505-507, add. E. On appeal, defendant has 
not marshaled the evidence supporting that implicit ruling, i.e., the prosecutor's written and 
verbal statements that he had no recollection of Hartley's testimony in the Teeter case, let 
alone that there was any difference between Hartley's Teeter testimony and his testimony 
here. See R423. Given defendant's failure to marshal or to otherwise show clear error in 
the trial court's ruling, the Court need not reach it. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,f13, 
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983 P.2d 556 (holding that where appellant makes no attempt to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's ruling, the reviewing court "accept[s] the trial court's findings"). 
No Abuse of Discretion. Further, defendant has not and cannot show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in ruling that the alleged impeachment evidence would have made 
no difference here. R499:2 and R505, 507, add. E. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 27,25 
P.3d 985. "As a general rule, newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial where 
its only use is impeachment." Id. at f 28, 25 P.3d 985. Because the Teeter transcript is not 
part of the record on appeal it is impossible to determine whether defendant has correctly 
characterized it. Even assuming that he has, however, it could only be used to impeach 
Hartley, which does not merit a new trial. Id. 
No Prejudice. Even if the Court were to "disregard" the Boyd rule, however, it 
"would have no occasion to reverse the trial court's ruling." Id. at Tf 29. As set forth 
previously in greater detail, Hartley's testimony was corroborated by Officer Machielson, 
Lori's and defendant's initial admissions that defendant lived in the condo, and by Lori's 
additional initial admission that defendant dealt drugs from the condo. See Point III, at pp. 
43-44, supra. Moreover, the $100 bill used in the third controlled buy was included in the 
$1450 cash defendant claimed. Id. Given this evidence, it is unlikely the jury would have 
acquitted defendant merely because Hartley used cocaine, in addition to marijuana, and did 




Defendant's jury convictions should be affirmed. 
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2ND DIST^TCT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the Affiant has reason to believe that: 
That on the prernise(s) known as: 
1120 CANYON RD., 02, OGDEN, UTAH: A two story single condominium that is brown m color, The 
condominium has a garage that sits to the North . The front door faces North-East and is brown in color 
The condominium is designated number 2 and has the number in gold over the front door. 
On the person of: Andrew Lucero u Hispanic male, 5*6 175 lbs., with b lack hair and brown eyes (DOB 9-25-
60) 
In the City of OGDEN, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
MARIJUANA, n green leafy substance in dried form. 
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich URS. 
• Materials for using marijuana: 
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side, 
2. Tipcs, used to smoke marijuana, 
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smokod, 
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dsu.es, amounts sold. 
• M i m I AMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
• Matenals for packaging mctharnphctamine, specifically small plastic baggier 
• Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tube* for snorting mcthamphctwnine, 
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, minors for holding methamphetamine while 
being snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
• Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine. 
That said property or evidence: 
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
• Has been used 10 commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant arc: 
Search Warrant Affidavit • PaR* J 
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Your affiant, Jeff Machiclson is a /< Mcc officer with the Ogdcn City Police Department and has bocn 
employe! as a police officer since March, 1998. Affiant is cunently assigned as an Agent foi the 
Wcbcr/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. Your affiant graduated from Crown Point High School in 
Crown Point Indiana in March, 1991.Your affiant graduated from Utah Police Officer Standards and 
Training Academy m February of 1997. Your Affiant has received numerous hours in narcotics training 
including training in search warrant preparation and execution. Your affiant has successfully completed 
the Utah Drug academy and the Regional Counter Drug Training Academy in Meridian, Mississippi 
Your affiant also has experience in instructing new police hires in narcotics identification. Your affiant 
has received training and has personal knowledge through his experience of the use, sales and 
manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphctamincs, marijuana, herom and other designer 
drugs. Your affiant knows what items would most be found al a premise where there are suspects using, 
selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and those items arc those that are to be searched for. 
On 10-11 -00 Your Affiant received an intelligence report that stated that Andrew Lucero was dealing larfie 
amounts of marijuana and methamphctamine. The report also said that Andrew was involved in '4 case where 
Agent Bills, along with your Affiant, seized 154 pounds of marijuana from a Riverdalo storage bhed The report 
also stated thai Andrew runs the *Tilc Man" store located tn the 1400 block of Washington Blv The report <*aid 
thai Andrew hides his narcotics a his home located at 1120 Canyon Rd tl2 und at the 'Tile Man'1 store. 
On 2-21-01 Your Affiant received information from Officer Verkler that he had responded to the 
"Tile Man" store located at 1408 Washington Blv. Officer Verkler made contact with Andrew Lucero who runs 
the store. The call for service was a suspeious cicumstance and no action was taken. 
Your Afficini checked Andrew Lucero's criminal history and found that he has several arrcus for distribution 
wd possession of a controlled substance dating back to 1986. 
hirthcr grounds for issuance ofa search warrant arc attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
In February of 2001 your Affiant was contacted by a confidential informant (hereafter referred to as CI) 
that marijuana could be purchased from Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd 112, Your Affiant met with the 
CM at a pre-arranged meeting spot and the CI was searched with no contraband being found. Your Affiant 
fitted the CI with an electronic monitoring device and given an amount of recorded Strike froree money. Your 
Affiant followed the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd #2 never losing site of the CI. The CI entered the condominium 
•and Your Affiant heard, via the electronic monitoring device, a discussion of price and quantity between the 
CI and a male. The CI left the condominium and was followed by your Affiant In w meeting spot. Youi 
Affiant never lost sight of the CI At the meeting spot the CI turned over a pfastic baggy that contained a 
green lcaty substance that Your Affiant recognized as marijuana. The CM stated that the mule voice thai your 
Affiant heard was Andrew Lucero, The CI also said that Andrew Lucero sold the marijuana to the CI. 
In February or 2001 Your Affiant was contacted by the CI who said that meihumphetamine could be 
purchased fiom Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd. « . Your Atfinnt met with the CI at a pre-arranged 
meeting spo( und the CI was searched. No contraband was found. The CM was fitted with an electronic 
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monitoring device and given an agj^unt of recorded Strike Force money. Your Affiant followed the CI to 
1120 Canyon Xd # 2 Your Affiant never lost sight of the d . The CI entered the condominium and youi 
Affiant heard the CI discuss price and quantity with a male voice identified as Andrew Lucero by the CI I he 
CI left the condominium and your Affiant followed the CI to a meeting spot. Your Affiant never lost sight 
of the CI At the meeting spot the CI turned over a plastic baggy that conUincd an amount of an off-white 
substance that your Affiant reeogni7cd as methamphetamme Your Affiant tested this substance in the type 
A NfK field test nn if showed a positive reaction for amphetamines. The CI told your Affiant that the sale was 
conducted by Andrew Luccro. The CI also said thai there is always a large amount of narcotics m the 
condominium 
Within the last 24 hours your Affiant conducted a third controlled purchase of methamphetamme from 
Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd, #2, Your Affiant was contacted by the CI and we met at a pre-arranged 
meeting spot The CI was searched with no contraband being found. The CI was fitted with an electronic 
monitoring device, flic CI was also given an amount of recorded Strike Force money Your Affiant followed 
the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd. #2 never losing sight of the CI. The CI went into the condominium a left a short 
time later Your Affiant followed the CI to the meeting spot ,nevcr losing sight of the CI, where the CI turned 
over an amount of a off-white substance that your Affiant recognised as methamphetamme The substance 
showed a positive reaction for amphetamines in the type A NIK field test kit. The CI said that the sale WAS 
conducted by Andrew Luccro. The CI also stated that Andrew took the money from the sale and put it in his 
pocket 
Your Affiant knows that distributers of narcotics often conceal money and evidence on there persons 
Your Affiant also knows that Andrew Luccro is a heavy user of methamphetamme. Your Affiant has been 
told by the CI that Andrew appeared to be under the influence of narcotics on all three purchases Youi 
Affiant knows, from training and experience, that narcotics users often conceal there personal use narcotics 
and the paraphernalia to ingest them on their persons. 
WH&KFFORJZ, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued foi the seizure of said items at any time dj> 
or night due to the following reasons: 
During the controlled purchases your Affiant saw vehicles coming to 1120 Canyon Rd. #2. Your Affiant also 
heard, via the electronic mentioning device, phone conversations from the suspect telling people to .stop by the 
house to purchase narcotics. Your Affiant knows, from training and experience, that if Police arc spotted 
approaching the residence that the suspect may have time to flee or destroy evidence concealed in the 
condominium. Your Affiant Believes that these individuals frequenting the house would inform the suspect of 
a police piesenee. Due to The location of the residence it will difficult for officers to approach. The residence 
siLs very near to the main entrance of the complex and your Affiant knows that the suspect may see Officers 
approaching in the daylight hours and have time to destroy evidence. 
It b further requested that the officer executing the warrant not be required to give notice of his authoj lty on 
purpobc because of the following reasons: 
Your Affiant has evidence of past violent criminal history on the suspect at this premise and a no nonce 
entry is needed for the safety of the officers. Your Affiant checked the criminal history of Andrew I uecro and 
found several arrests for assault, assault with injury and interfering with airest. Your Affiant also found that 
Andrew Lucero was suspect in several lecent assaults that did not result in arrest. 
Your Affiant has received information from a confidential informant that the suspect at this location have 
made threats of violent behavior if police are to attempt to enter the premises. Your Affiant has received 
information from the C! that the suspect does not like Police. The suspect also has u past history of resisting 
henrth WnrrfttU Affidavit • /'//iff .* 
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arrest. Your Affiant also heard, via tt]£jJectronic monitoring device, the suspect talking about previous assaults 
and how he would conduct them. 
Your Affiant believes that if given the opportunity the suspect may pose a threat to Officers attempting 
to execute the search warrant, Your Affiant also knows, from training and experience, that the suspect could 
bamoade himself inside the condominium if given the opportunity and therefore causing safety concerns for the 
Officers. 
Your Affiant believes that Andrew Lucero is running an ongoing narcotics distribution operation from 
1120 Canyon Rd. #2 . Your Affiant believes that this criminal activity will continue to be a threat to the 
surrounding community if it is not stopped. 
The CI has worked for several different Agents of the Strike Force for several years, '('he CI has 
provided information that has led to several arrests and convictions for narcotics violations and seizures of 
large quantities of narcotics. The CI has provided your Affiant with their full and correct information and 
has made all appointments on time. The CI is a former drug user and is knowledgeable is the appearancefuse 
and distribution of narcotics. The CI has maintained daily contact with your Affiant. The CI is not suspect in 
this or any pending cases, 
tP^\ 
AFFIANT 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
COURT: All right. What other matters did you 
handle then at 
MR. LAWRENCE: 
this time? I know we had several 
The only other thing we were going to 1 









LAWRENCE: We can pick up on that 




And in that regard, I' 
COURT: All right. Now, just for 
which case are 
about the first degree 
search i 
MR. LAWRENCE: 
we talking about? Are 
felony? Is that — 
Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
OFFICER MACHIELSON: 0248 69? 
MR. LAWRENCE: 1619. 








COURT: All right. This is case 
LAWRENCE: Yes. 
COURT: All right. 
SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I believe 
ion to 1 
part of it. J 
d like to call 1 
the record 1 
we talking 
is this the 1 
1619? 
there's 
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witnesses present in the courtroom. We!d ask that they be 
excluded. They might be called to testify at trial. 
THE COURT: Any other witnesses on this matter then? 
MR. LAWRENCE: It would be Mr. Johnson and 
Ms. Lucero, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. If you folks will 
step out again. 
MR. JOHNSON: Can we come back in on the prelim 
stage? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: All right. Thank you. 
JEFF MACHIELSON, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Go ahead, if you're ready. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAWRENCE: 
Q. Again, Officer Machielson, I believe you've been sworn 
under oath. You understand that you're still under oath? 
A. I do. 
Q. For your testimony. 
And, again, would you state your name and the county in 
your residence — the county of your residence? 
A. The county of my residence? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. Weber County, Jeff Machielson. 
Q. Okay. And you're one of the investigating officers in 
this; is that correct? 
A. I am. I'm the case agent. 
Q. Okay. And have you ever been with Andrew Lucero when he 
was using methamphetamine? 
A. Have I ever been with him when he was using? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever been with him when you — or have you ever 
seen him use methamphetamine? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever been with him when he was under the 
influence of methamphetamine? 
A. I'm not a D.R.E. expert so I couldn't say whether he was 
or he wasn't. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever, personal 
knowledge, that he — prior to the search warrant being 
issued in this case, do you have any knowledge that he was a 
user of methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Personal knowledge of that. 
A. Not per — well, I guess I should rephrase that. Not 
personal knowledge. Only what I've been told by the 
informant. 
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Q. Okay. And — and the informant's Russ Hartley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And so your knowledge about his use of 
methamphetamine is based solely on what Russ Hartley has told 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's prior to the search warrant being issued? 
A. Prior to the search — are you asking whether I know 
specifically that he uses methamphetamine, or drugs in 
general? 
Q. Okay. No, I'm — I'm asking — let me rephrase that. 
And I'm limiting my time from any time that you've known 
Mr. Lucero up until the search warrant was issued in this 
case. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you ever used methamphetamines with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And do you have personal knowledge up until the 
search warrant was issued that Mr. Lucero was a user of 
methamphetamines, other than as Russ Hartley has communicated 
to you? 
A. Okay. I understand now. No. No. 
Q. Okay. You're familiar with — in the affidavit for the 
search warrant, there's a reference to a 154-pound marijuana 
bust? 




Q. Seizure? And I believe it was in your intelligence 
report as well, reference to that. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall when that took place? 
A. When we received the report? 
Q. No, I'm sorry. When the seizure of that 154 pounds of 
marijuana occurred. 
A. I don't have that case report in front of me. I don't 
know the exact date, no. 
Q. Okay. Isn't it true — well, was anybody ever charged in 
that matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was Andrew Lucero ever charged in that matter? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I have no further questions for this 
witness, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Any questions? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Just a couple. 
CROS S -EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAUNDERS: 
Q. You say you have no personal knowledge of his use; 
however, did you overhear some conversations between Andrew 
and the C.I.? 




Q. Okay. And from those conversations, did you come up with 
an opinion as to what they were talking about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And what was that? 
A. About narcotics. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. SAUNDERS: I don't have any further questions, 
Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAWRENCE: 
Q. Well, in regard to that, you heard conversations. Were 
you within earshot? 
A. No. It was heard over — and I don't know if you want me 
to say it. This is — that's a separate case. That would be 
during the — the buys, not during the search warrant. Does 
that make a difference? 
Q. Well, that's what I'm saying. The — I'm referring to 
the conversations that you had with — either that you had or 
that you heard between Russ Hartley and Andrew Lucero that 
led you to believe that he was using narcotics. 
A. Yes, I did — I did hear them. I wasn't like glass to 
the door or anything like that, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you hear them through some taping device? 
A. Through — well, it's an electronic monitoring device. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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It's not a taping device. 
Q. Okay. You — you canft tape the conversation. 
A. Well, if you rig it with a tape recorder, yes, you can. 
Q. But in this case, in referring to the four buys that you 
had with Russ Hartley, you did not rig — the three buys, you 
did not rig them with a tape recorder; is that right? 
A. No. No. 
Q. Okay. And you had knowledge — you formed an opinion 
then that he was using narcotics; is that correct? 
A. That he was using at the time — 
Q. Yes, that's what I!m asking. 
A. — of the controlled purchase? No, I couldn't tell if he 
was — like I couldn't hear smoke being inhaled or anything 
like that, no. 
Q. Okay. Just one follow-up to — on the search warrant 
that was ultimately issued, you're the one that served the 
search warrant; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were in charge of that investigation? 
A. I don't know if you'd say — I'm — I'm the case agent. 
My sergeants are in charge, but I'm the — I don't know if 
you want to call it the lead investigator. I'm the drafter 
of the affidavit for the search warrant and it is my case as 
far as for recording purposes. 
Q. Was there anybody — when the search warrant was served 
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on the residence where it was served, was there anybody 
superior to you there serving that? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Who was in charge on that? 
A, Well, there was two — there were two sergeants there, 
Sergeant Acker and Sergeant Holmes, 
Q. Okay. Who — was the search warrant delivered to 
anybody — served on anybody? 
A. Do you mean — 
Q. On any person. 
A. Well, no. It was a search warrant for — for a 
residence, so — 
Q. So you just used that. Throughout the search, were you 
still the lead investigator? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I don't know if this makes a difference, but 
technically what we're called is a case agent, and I'm also 
the evidence custodian. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That way we don't have — 
Q. And you've always been that throughout the duration from 
the — from the time the search warrant was served until 
today? 
A. Well, until I turn the evidence over, and until it's 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R, 
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booked into evidence Ifm the evidence — and then it goes to 
the O.P.D. evidence custodian, 
Q. Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I have no further questions. 
MR. SAUNDERS: No further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer, you can step down. 
OFFICER MACHIELSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Laurie, did you get the title of this 
case? We've been jumping around between cases here. 
This is State of Utah versus Andrew Lucero and it's case 
that ends in 1619, and this is a motion to suppress. We've 
started off with it and then we continued it over till this 
evening, so it was different than the case you heard earlier. 
Okay. 
All right. Anything else, Mr. Lawrence? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you want to argue the 
question then on the motion to suppress? 
MR. LAWRENCE: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Or the motion to quash the search 
warrant? 
MR. LAWRENCE: At this time, Your Honor, it's in 
regard to the motion to suppress and we — we put on evidence 
to this and — and I want the Court to be alerted to a couple 
of things. 
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Our concern, Your Honor, has always been that the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant we allege is 
woefully inadequate. We have already alerted the Court that 
the first reference and first request to the judge issuing 
the search warrant alleged that the affiant — and the 
affiant in this case has been Officer Machielson — that he 
received an intelligence report. 
Number one, it's a misrepresentation that it was an 
intelligence report. Subsequent thereto, the Court directed 
him to define what it was and what we have is an anonymous 
report which is nothing more than hearsay on hearsay. And 
even that report isn't reflected in the paragraph that is 
addressed to this judge saying that — the report said that 
Andrew was involved in a case where Agent Bills, along with 
your affiant, Officer Machielson, seized 154 pounds of 
marijuana from a Riverdale storage shed. 
The Court needs to be aware that, number one, that was 
first and foremost given to the Court to issue the warrant. 
That was not an intelligence report. That was an 
unidentified, uncorroborated statement. At that time, Andrew 
Lucero was not under any investigation. 
I will refer the Court to the preliminary hearing 
transcript that was conducted on September 12th of last year, 
on page 62 therein, when he was — when Officer Machielson 
was testifying. And on line 10 it states — on line 5 it 
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says — and the answer — the question: So at that time you 
weren't — 
And the answer by Officer Machielson: And could — 
could I reiterate that? I just want to make it clear that 
we — and I say we, as the Strike Force, knew who Andrew 
Lucero was. 
Question: Clearly, because you'd had prior dealings 
with him. 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: But he wasn't under investigation at that 
time or under suspicion for being involved. 
Answer: Not at that present time, no. 
Question: So Mr. Hartley brought that information to 
you. 
Answer: Yes. 
Clearly, prior to the alleged buys there was no 
investigation of Andrew Lucero. He was not suspected, he was 
not under investigation. That's important because the actual 
report that they have categorized as an intelligence report 
made reference to that Andrew Lucero had admitted to this 
unidentified person that he was involved in this 154-pound 
marijuana bust. Officer Machielson has testified that 
Mr. Lucero was never charged with that. 
And we would ask the Court to take judicial notice on 
September 28th of the year 2000, the front page of section CI 
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of the Standard-Examiner, there was a big expose1, front page 
on the C section, about that very bust. That was common 
public knowledge as of September and so there wasn't anything 
in there that would allude or give any credible evidence or 
reason to believe that Mr. Lucero was involved in that. 
Indeed, Mr. Machielson at that time had no — no reason to 
suspect him. He was not involved in it. 
Then they go from there into the — the buys. And I 
know counsel will argue that even if we redact the portion 
that may be tainted, that the standard is that the Court can 
still say would there be enough left over that a court could 
issue that warrant. 
Judge, we have two concerns there. First of all, the 
argument is that if it was tainted in the procuring of that 
affidavit — or that search warrant, and then it is acted 
upon in good faith, then the taint is — does not prohibit 
the fruits of — of that search warrant. 
But in this case, Officer Machielson has always been the 
in — the lead investigator on this case. He is the one that 
served the search warrant. He's the one that produced the 
affidavit, that procured the search warrant, and then served 
it. And until this date, he has still been the lead 
investigator on this case. 
The concern there is this, Your Honor. We also look on 
page 3 of that search warrant, and the second paragraph of 
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the third — second sentence of the third paragraph on that 
page begins, quote, your affiant also knows that Andrew 
Lucero is a heavy user of methamphetamine. 
Officer Machielson has testified here today until he had 
the conversations with Russ Hartley, he did have no 
knowledge. And he had no personal knowledge other than the 
conversations with Russ Hartley. 
What's important here is this, Your Honor. On its face 
that seems rather innocuous, but it is deadly serious here. 
What we have is what we call a misrepresentation. I call it 
a lie. It's getting — it's accomplishing an end that — 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
this. This — I mean this attack on the officer is 
unwarranted, and if he's going to call him a liar here, I 
think we need to have a full-blown hearing on this. 
THE COURT: Well, the — 
MR. LAWRENCE: We are having a full-blown hearing, 
Your Honor. 
MR. SAUNDERS: This is not appropriate, Your Honor, 
for him to attack the officer this way and to call him a 
liar. 
THE COURT: The question here is — 
MR. SAUNDERS: If he wants to say what — 
THE COURT: — whether or not there's something in 
the affidavit that is — is wrong — 
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MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: — or misleading. So if you want to 
confine your comments to what's in the affidavit that's — 
that's what we're here for. 
MR. LAWRENCE: What I'm focusing on, Your Honor, is 
that statement. And I'm saying that it is a 
mischaracterization. I'm saying it's stronger than that, 
that it is a misrepresentation. I'm saying it's stronger 
than that based on Officer Machielson's testimony. That it 
is a lie. 
I am then saying that we look at those two incidents, 
the — the effort to — under a guise of an intelligence 
report, and in reference to this 154-pound marijuana bust, 
also in reference to I have personal knowledge that this 
guy's a heavy user, that convinces a judge this guy knows 
that Andrew Lucero is a drug user. 
Then we couple that with these taped buys that they 
selectively now have said were never taped. They were 
monitored, but never taped. And the Court recalls that this 
has been an issue throughout. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Objection. We never said they were 
ever taped, Your Honor. This is misrepresentation. Let's 
get the facts straight. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. LAWRENCE: I'll refer the Court to the prior 




THE COURT: Again, all I — all I'm looking at is 
the four corners of the affidavit. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: That's what this is all about. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: So, again, if you want to confine your 
comments to what's in the affidavit or isn't in the 
affidavit, that's fine. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Well, but when I confine my comments 
to the affidavit, Judge, if I can demonstrate that it's a 
misrepresentation by his testimony in the preliminary 
hearing, that satisfies or should satisfy this Court that 
this affidavit was used wrongfully to procure a search 
warrant. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but what the affidavit says is 
that they monitored the conversation between the C.I. and the 
defendant. They listened in on the conversation. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: It doesn't say that they ever taped the 
conversation. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. And what I'm referring the 
Court to is the two prior preliminary hearings where there 
was a discussion between Mr. Gravis and counsel here where 
they were talking about the tapes that they had and that they 
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had tapes of the buys. Subsequent thereto it was told to us 
that there are no tapes. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, that's specifically — 
that's specifically talking about the witness tampering case. 
THE COURT: Right. You're talking apples and 
oranges here, Mr. Lawrence. What you're talking about here 
is what's in the affidavit. They listened to a conversation 
between the C.I. and the defendant on three different 
occasions. That's not the same as the tapes you're talking 
about. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Okay. Judge, and again, I'll — I'll 
look at it and try to pattern it after the prelims that were 
here because — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: — the taped conversations reference 
the tapes of the buys, not the tapes of the witness 
tampering. 
MR. SAUNDERS: That's wrong. I'd like to see that. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And I'll refer to that, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And I'll bring that back up. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: But what I'm doing is this. I think 
I can attack this affidavit on, number one, the ground that 
they purported that they had this intelligence report which 
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is an oxymoron. It was nothing more than an unidentified 
statement by somebody saying that Andrew Lucero said he was 
involved with this 154-pound marijuana bust, that Officer 
Machielson knew was not the case, that the world-at-large, as 
of September, knew about. 
And then he comes in and tells the judge, this is what 
we have here. Second with that, we have these three buys that 
I set up. Third with that we have personal knowledge on my 
part that this happened. 
Now, at least, the very least — 
MR. SAUNDERS: I111 object to the personal 
knowledge. Maybe he could refer specifically to the 
affidavit. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And I'll refer to the affidavit, 
Judge. 
MR. SAUNDERS: The affidavit does not say personal 
knowledge. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. The affidavit says: Your 
affiant also knows that Andrew Lucero is a heavy user of 
methamphetamine. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Correct. DoesnTt say how he knows. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I — I will say to the Court that 
that kind of a statement is an effort to convince the Court I 
know. I think when it says affiant, I could substitute the 
word I. And if I say affiant knows, or if I say I know, what 
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Ifm communicating to Your Honor is that I have knowledge of 
that. And I think I'm saying that I have personal knowledge 
of that and that's an inaccurate statement. 
THE COURT: But isn't the key to the affidavit the 
fact that they send a confidential informant in on not one, 
not two, but three different occasions to make purchases from 
the defendant? That's really the heart of the affidavit, 
isn't it? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No, that's what you're wanting to say 
saves the affidavit because if we redact the rest of it, we 
still have three buys that in and of themselves couldn't 
stand — 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm saying. Is — 
let's assume that we throw out everything else. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. Then do we keep the buy? 
THE COURT: The heart of this affidavit is that they 
made three different purchases from the defendant with a 
confidential informant. They listened in on it, they 
monitored the conversation, they watched him go in and go 
out, and then they list why he's a reliable informant. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: What evidence is there that any of that 
is false? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Now, this is the evidence for that, 
Judge. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And first of all, I don't want to say 
the heart of the affidavit. I think the heart of the 
affidavit was the most salient fact: Judge, we have an 
intelligence report where he's involved with a 154-pound 
marijuana bust. I think that's — 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lawrence, you agree, if that's 
all they had — 
MR. LAWRENCE: Okay. 
THE COURT: If that's all they had was the 
intelligence report, there isn't a judge around that would 
have issued a search warrant for the home, right? The 
intelligence report. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I'm — I'm saying that if the judge 
knew that it wasn't an intelligence report that he had. 
THE COURT: Well, when you — when you couple that 
with sending a C.I. in on three different occasions — 
MR. LAWRENCE: Well, wait, wait, wait, Judge. 
Judge. I'm okay if — if the Court considers first that — 
let's take out his statement that it's an intelligence 
report. Let's take out his statement that he has knowledge. 
Let's limit it solely to the — the buys. The concern we 
have there is, as I've articulated, that would be okay but 
for Officer Machielson is the one involved with those buys, 
too. 
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I am suggesting to this Court and I am arguing that 
everything that Officer Machielson has done is suspect. The 
reason why Ifm doing that is this. Your Honor. And you say 
do I have evidence as to the — 
THE COURT: The three buys. 
MR. LAWRENCE: — the three buys and — and that. I 
have evidence, Your Honor. The evidence is this. The 
evidence that the Court can consider is the evidence that it 
heard in the — that to date has not been concluded — the 
evidentiary hearing so far on the most recent witness 
tampering where Russ Hartley was on the stand and made 
allegations. His credibility is in question here. 
The evidence that you can consider is Officer 
Machielson!s statements in chambers when he said in regard to 
these taped conversations of jail conversations, where he 
said, Judge, it says this. And he doesn't take the liberty 
to tell the judge: You know, Judge, it does have 
conversations here. There is definitely a heated 
conversation between them. But it does have this language, 
Judge. 
And it — I'm not going to tell you that he also says: 
I guess I should just give that up. And I'm not going to 
tell you that she says: Well, I wouldn't even know where to 
get a hold of him. What he says is: Judge, all I can say is 
it does say something to the effect we've got to get Michael 
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to get Russ. 
I'm taking all of those things together, Judge, and I!m 
saying that Officer Machielson's testimony is tainted. And, 
therefore, if he's the one administering the buys, if he's 
the one administering the search warrant, that taint from the 
procuring of the search warrant down until it is effected 
carries through. 
THE COURT: But — but, Mr. Lawrence, you — you 
send — the police send an informant in on three different 
occasions to make a buy of marijuana and methamphetamine. 
They then obtain a search warrant and they go into that very 
residence and guess what they find? Marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
Doesn't that just suggest the opposite? That this 
officer is being truthful and that maybe they did make buys 
in there, when they go in and find the very thing that they 
claim that they've gone into with the C.I. on three different 
occasions? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. No, it doesn't, Judge. The 
evidence will bear out that when they went in there to find 
it, they couldn't find it and they had to call the informant 
and say, wait, where is it? And he tells them, well, look 
here. The informant's telling them where to find the 
marijuana. 
THE COURT: So is there a theory that somehow it was 
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planted by the C.I. or — 
MR. LAWRENCE: My theory at this point, Judge, is 
that I have no credibility for Officer Machielson or for 
the — Russ Hartley. 
THE COURT: Well, wouldn't you have a better 
argument though if they'd gone in with a search warrant and 
found absolutely nothing? Wouldn't that support your claim 
that somehow the police either planted this or the C.I. did 
this or — 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. No, Judge, that would just make 
this be a — a stupid case. Nobody would file a case if 
there was no evidence. 
THE COURT: That's true. 
MR. LAWRENCE: What you have here is evidence, but 
what I'm looking at is how did they get to that point of 
getting evidence. And what they've done is take one step 
upon one step. And they do have three buys, and in and of 
themselves, they may have been fine. But they're tainted 
because Officer Machielson has been involved from the git-go, 
THE COURT: But — but what is the taint? I guess 
that's what I'm saying. Are — are you saying that Officer 
Machielson planted the drugs that were found at the home? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. No. I'm saying — 
THE COURT: Or that they made up the whole C.I.? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No, Judge. I — 
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THE COURT: What are you saying then that makes them 
so tainted? That's what ITm having trouble with. 
MR. LAWRENCE: They went in to a judge, to a court 
of law and said, look, I think I have enough evidence to get 
a search warrant. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: What they didn't tell the judge is 
I — Ifve tainted it. Ifm going to throw out some stuff here 
that will inflame it. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I want to know. What 
is it that's tainted, that — that's a lie here? 
Specifically with reference to the three buys that were made 
by the C.I. 
MR. LAWRENCE: At this point I don't have to prove 
that the three buys are not — that they didn't occur or that 
they didn't result in a — in a find of illegal drugs — 
drugs or contraband. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: What I have to show the Court is that 
the person that was in charge of those three buys is the same 
person that took the liberties with the Court to say I have 
an intelligence report — that he didn't have; to say that I 
have knowledge — that he doesn't have. 
THE COURT: But what the intelligence report says is 
that he was given information — meaning the police 
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officer — that Mr. Lucero was hiding drugs at his business 
and at his home on Canyon Road, number 2. What's — what's 
wrong with that? 
MR. LAWRENCE: There's nothing wrong with that, 
Judge. There's nothing — there's — that in and of itself 
doesn't rise to the level of being the intelligence report. 
THE COURT: That's right. But that's information 
that the officer received, right? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Oh, but — but he's coloring it, 
Judge, 
THE COURT: He says, this guy's a drug dealer. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Yeah, but he's coloring it. 
THE COURT: You better take a look at it. He's 
what? 
MR. LAWRENCE: He's coloring it. 
THE COURT: How? 
MR. LAWRENCE: He's not just saying that. He's 
saying he — Andrew himself told me he was involved in that 
154-pound marijuana bust. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Okay. He's coloring it. When — 
when — if I come to you and say, Judge, I have reason to 
believe that this man is dealing drugs — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. LAWRENCE: — I've got evidence here that he's 
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involved in that 154-pound bust that we just did — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: — I think you're going to lend a 
listening ear. 
THE COURT: But what difference does it make? I 
guess that's the point. If somebody comes to law enforcement 
and says we believe that Mr. Lucero is dealing drugs, 
honestly, we're not going to issue a warrant. No judge is 
going to issue a warrant based on that, right? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: But if the police then begin to put 
together a case by sending in a confidential informant to 
make buys from him on three different occasions, isn't that 
probable call to issue a search warrant? And isn't that what 
we've got here? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Judge, I'm — I'm arguing that that's 
not the case. I'm arguing that it was orchestrated rather 
than set up to see if we have veri — verifiability. It was 
orchestrated. 
THE COURT: Well, but — and you're right. Let's 
assume all we had was the intelligence report. We wouldn't 
issue a search warrant on the intelligence report, would we? 
But if we send a C.I. on — in to make three different buys 
and he comes out with marijuana and methamphetamine, isn't 
that enough by itself to issue a search warrant? 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R, 
(801) 395-1055 
28 
MR. LAWRENCE: No, No, Judge. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. LAWRENCE: It isnTt enough if I can demonstrate 
that it was orchestrated rather than just a buy that took 
place. 
THE COURT: Okay. ITm just having such a tough time 
with this trying to figure out where you're going in terms of 
why it isn't enough, what's not reliable. You know, I want 
to pin this down to what is there in the affidavit that is 
not true in terms of these three buys by the C.I. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And we're not challenging that here 
at this point, Judge. I'm not — I'm not going to tell you, 
Judge, this is what happened and expect you to take that as 
testimony. That's what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. Okay. That's 
what I needed to know. I'm just having a tough time figuring 
out what the argument is. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Right. 
THE COURT: I hear you, but I'm not sure where 
you're coming from, I guess. 
MR. LAWRENCE: I can argue that other hearings we've 
had we've talked in terms of tapes existing, not existing, 
but that's my interpretation versus Mr. Saunders'. 
THE COURT: I don't think those have anything to do 
with that search warrant. 
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MR. LAWRENCE: But I can argue his statement that he 
was in line of sight, and he gives a description. It!s 
wrong, but that's my interpretation of the testimony that's 
been presented here. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: What I'm looking at is showing the 
Court the way this search warrant was obtained was through 
artifact. It was through an effort here to persuade the 
Court with information that it did happen. The buys — and 
I — I understand what the Court is saying, is that the buy 
in and of itself may stand alone. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks, Mr. Lawrence. 
Mr. Saunders, any response? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I just want to address a 
couple of things because there is no misrepresentation here 
by the officer. This intelligence report is just that. I 
think maybe it's a lack of experience or knowledge on 
Mr. Lawrence's part about how the search warrants or 
affidavits are put together. That information is only to 
give a background about why this person became a suspect., 
Agent Machielson isn't putting that in there to base the 
search warrant on. He's indicating we have a Tip-a-Cop line, 
people call that all the time. This is information. This is 
an intelligence report that we receive from — from a source. 
That means no more to the judge than anything else. They 
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received a report that this person might be involved in drug 
sales. 
Was Agent Machielson asking the search warrant be issued 
on that basis? Absolutely not. He followed that up — he 
tried to follow up a little bit, found out that an Ogden 
police officer at least verified the fact that Andrew Lucero 
did run a business called the Tile Man and that it was 
located where the C.I. said it was. That's corroborating 
that a little bit. 
Itfs not until that point. Your Honor, that we get to 
the meat of the affidavit, and the judge understands that. 
That first part of that just sets the stage about where 
Mr. Lucero became a suspect. And, certainly, any one of 
those buys would have been sufficient probable cause to 
justify the search warrant. In this case we have three. 
I also dispute the fact that Agent Machielson said he 
had personal knowledge that he was a drug user. He said he 
had knowledge. He also expressed throughout the affidavit 
that — where that base of knowledge came from. There's no 
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MR. LAWRENCE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on the briefs that 
I!ve taken a look at and also the arguments of counsel, I?m 
going to deny the motion to quash the search warrant. As you 
recall, a search warrant which has been signed by a judge is 
presumed to be valid. In this case it was signed by Judge 
Taylor — or at least starts off with the presumption the 
search warrant is valid. 
Second, the Court will find that the affidavit in this 
case is sufficient to establish probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant. The affidavit I thought was 
fairly well written. It starts off indicating that police 
had received — they called it an intelligence report. What 
it is essentially is somebody has given them information 
about people who are dealing drugs. 
And the two areas that I thought were significant was 
that they indicated Mr. Lucero hides drugs at the Tile Man, 
which was his business at 1400 Washington Boulevard; and| 
also, at his home located on Canyon Road, apartment number 2. 
Then they indicated that they did some checking and found he 
did have a criminal history, had several arrests for 
possession of controlled substances, at least one in 1986. 
And then third, and probably most significant, is the 
fact that the police are able to have a confidential 
informant go in, make three different purchases from the 
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defendant at Canyon Road, number — apartment number 2. They 
indicated that they monitored and listened in on 
conversations and transactions. They watched the 
transaction. There was one in February of 2001, a second buy 
also in February of 2001 at the same address, and a third buy 
involving methamphetamine which took place within 24 hours of 
the search warrant being issued, again, at that same address 
involving the same defendant. Again, it was monitored by the 
police. 
So I think — in addition to that they indicated what 
was reliable about the confidential informant, that he'd 
given information to the police in the past. Those — the 
information of the confidential informant had led to several 
arrests and convictions for drug offenses. 
He indicated that he was a former drug user himself and 
he was familiar with the procedure for selling of drugs and 
he had no cases pending at the time. 
So I just think the fact that the C.I. went in under 
police control on three different occasions to make buys from 
the defendant certainly would establish probable cause by 
itself to authorize the issuance of the search warrant. So 
based on that, the Court will deny the motion. 
All right. Anything else we need to cover? 
MR. SAUNDERS: I think we're scheduled to come back 
the 17th, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Appreciate your time, Judge. 
THE CLERK: Judge, I have a question. On the 
preliminary hearing — I guess we are scheduled for the 17th, 
I'm just wondering when to schedule that for — when to 
schedule the decision for? 
THE COURT: I'll have a decision on the 17th then 
when we come back. Okay? 
We are in recess. 
(Proceedings conclude) 
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THE COURT: That satisfies that. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Yeah. The other thing is, Judge, I 
would ask the Court order that the state turn over any tapes 
relative to the buys. My understanding is they're saying 
there is no tape now — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. LAWRENCE: — but I would like that to be 
ordered that it be turned over. At the trial I want to be 
able to have an order that Ifm relying on the fact that those 
tapes do not exist. \ 
MR. SAUNDERS: I111 have Detective Machielson go 
back and look. He indicated there was nothing, he'll look 
again and, your Honor, if there is something, we'll turn it 
over. We're happy to do that. 
MR. MACHIELSON: I wouldn't — your Honor, I have no 
absolutely no problem turning over any tapes for discovery to 
the defense, the problem is they don't exist. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAWRENCE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, should we move to 
prosecutor's motion in limine? And Mr. Saunders, did you 
want to address that issue? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Thank you, your Honor. I think we 
come down mainly to the issue the defense indicates that 
these convictions were too old and shouldn't be admitted, 
40 
your Honor, The dates on these prior convictions as they 
relate to these offenses are about eight and a half years. 
Your Honor, there is other precedent in the code that 
talks about convictions being admitted less than 10 years old 
and the Rules of Evidence, convictions if they're less than 
10 years old and deal with a felony can come in. And also 
that rule, your Honor, talks about release from incarceration 
from the conviction of that offense. Mr. Lucero did go to 
prison on those prior offenses, he did go back once on a 
parole violations, so that lessens the time after he was 
released from those, your Honor, from when he committed these 
new offenses. 
I think the other things, the other elements are set out. 
Their main dispute was as to that. So if the Court has 
specific questions to that I!ll respond to that. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you: Are you asking to 
offer that as part of your case in chief or in rebuttal? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yes, your Honor. No, under 4 04B 
that's part of your case in chief, your Honor, to show his 
intent. It also goes to establish the element of the prior 
conviction to enhance these. So that's what we're requesting 
under 404(b) that this be admitted as part of our case in 
chief. 
THE COURT: Well, normally on the enhancement when 
we do a jury trial, we don't mention the enhancement as part 
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of the case we just read the information. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Typically those are bifurcated and I 
would agree if that were the only reason, the state would be 
willing to do that. But your Honor, he's put his intent 
specifically at issue in this case by saying he wasn't 
involved in the possession of the drugs that were located in 
his home. The case law specifically talks about situations 
like that where you can use prior convictions to show 
somebody's intent, and we believe that we've established that 
clearly that he did have the prior convictions. It's 
appropriate to admit those under the circumstance under the 
case law, and we'd ask the Court to grant our motion in 
limine allowing that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to just take a minute and 
tell me what the similarities are between the convictions 
and — 
MR. SAUNDERS: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — and the case in chief? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Again, in those cases, it was a 
confidential informant that made the buys. The substances 
that we were again talking about were marijuana and 
methamphetamine. The buys were made from the defendant's 
home, they were controlled buys by a strike force agency at 
that point, and they're similar to that respect, your Honor. 
In that case he also denied the fact that he had any 
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ownership of those drugs. They're similar to all those 
respects. I think that placed clearly at issue his intent in 
this case, his intent to possess that, his prior knowledge, 
plan, preparation. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you from your standpoint: 
Are you just intending to offer the certified convictions or 
were you going to offer testimony? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I believe that we would 
be limited to offering the certified convictions to show 
that. I don't believe we could bring in officers to 
specifically talk about those prior buys. That's my 
recollection. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else you 
wanted to mention then? 
MR. SAUNDERS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lawrence, did you want 
to respond? 
MR. LAWRENCE: Yes, Judge. There is not the 
similarity that counsel would ask the Court to accept. The 
prior conviction involved buys regarding marijuana. No 
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of a sudden the issue of, well, now your intent comes into 
play. We've argued, in essence, that we're saying the best 
they have is a constructive possession. The difference is 
with that other charge was that that was a place where he 
clearly was staying with a roommate, this is not at his 
residence. So that coupled with the fact that this one 
includes meth as well is different, number one. 
Number two, they don't need to bring it into their case 
in chief. I think the Court is absolutely correct and I 
think the Jamison case that counsel provided in their 
response to my objection clearly articulates the procedure 
just as you stated, that it should be after a conviction, if 
and after a conviction, then it is presented at that stage. 
Procedurally that's how it should be handled, not in their 
case in chief. 
THE COURT: Okay. But let me ask you: If a 
defendant is saying, hey, this is a mistake, I didn't have 
anything to do with these drugs that are found in my home or 
where I'm residing, and a jury learns that he's been 
convicted before for the same thing, doesn't that evidence go 
directly to this question of his intent? 
MR. LAWRENCE: They have to prove first that it is 
his residence, Judge. It is drastically different. 
THE COURT: Well, right. I understand that. But if 
we've got a defendant saying, hey, gee, I didn't have 
44 
anything to do with the drugs, I don't know anything about 
them, I just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time and then you have evidence showing that he!s made sales 
of drugs on other occasions, doesn't that evidence go 
directly to that issue? 
MR. LAWRENCE: I don't think it does, Judge, Again, 
I'm arguing on behalf of my client because what they are 
trying to do is quote, unquote, bootstrap this. It's 
clearly — it's different than the last case. We're holding 
the last conviction over his head like the sword of Damocles, 
and this case we're not entitled to do that. This doesn't 
show anything other than technically it gives them the 
opportunity to enhance the charges. This isn't used to show 
the intent because it's different, Judge. That was not his 
residence, the first time was his residence and that. The 
first time involved marijuana, this time involves marijuana 
and methamphetamines. It's clearly different. They can't 
use that conviction and bootstrap to show intent on this one. 
THE COURT: I agree. If the conviction had nothing 
to do with selling or distributing drugs, for example, let's 
say it was a theft conviction or a forgery, then it wouldn't 
have any relevance. But here they're trying to show a 
similarity between what he was convicted of in 1992 and what 
he's on trial for at this time in 2002, so isn't that a 
little different? 
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MR. LAWRENCE: It is different, Ifm not going to 
argue it!s not, Judge. But it's a quantum leap for them to 
be able to do that, to bootstrap this in. The fact that 
they're looking at it — they have this technical window of 
opportunity that says, hey, we get to bring it in because of 
this technicality. But the Court can look at it and see that 
you know what, we're clearly well beyond any notion of modus 
operandi or of a pattern of what had happened here. We're 
almost to the 10-year period here where even the Court 
wouldn't entertain this discussion. 
THE COURT: Well, did you take a look at the two 
cases, the Ramirez and the Taylor case that were cited by the 
prosecutor? I mean, they seem to be fairly similar to what 
we're talking about here, evidence involving prior 
convictions for offenses that are similar to what he's on 
trial for. And in those cases, the court said that it was 
all right to admit the convictions. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Yeah. But in both of those cases it 
was all right because I think the court was able to establish 
that there is a nexus here and the issue is directly at hand 
here. In this case I'm saying that it's not. They have a 
burden first. What they're trying to do is bootstrap 
everything else into it. The only thing that I can argue I 
think is, Judge, in relation to time and the dissimilarity in 
the two offenses, this one should not be bootstrapped into 
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the present case, the prior convictions should not be 
bootstrapped into the present case prior case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, let me clarify — I!m 
sorry. 
MR. LAWRENCE: That's all I have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, let me clarify one thing. 
He was correct about the prior convictions. I thought that 
they involved methamphetamine as well but they involve 
marijuana. The similarity there, your Honor, there was a 
large quantity of marijuana that was found in that case. 
There was almost a pound of marijuana that was found in this 
case. All evidence is that this was Mr. Lucero's residence. 
His girlfriend indicated that these drugs were his that he 
had sold from the house in the past. This isn't in a 
constructive possession case as far as that goes. Your 
Honor, these offenses are similar, and based on the case laws 
as the court cited, the admission is appropriate. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Judge, brief response to — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And that is and I111 bring up again 
the lack of similarity. The prior case, the prior 
conviction, Mr. Lucero was arrested at his residence. In 
this case, there's no question he was arrested at his 
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residence which is not the place where the drugs were found. 
He was transported to this place, Judge. And so thereTs 
clearly a definite line of demarkation as far as any 
similarity with these. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I think I'm inclined 
to grant the motion in limine at this point. ITm going to 
allow the state to introduce evidence to the prior 
convictions only as to drugs, okay? So I assume we're just 
talking about distribution or possession of controlled 
substances. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Thatf s correct. 
THE COURT: And those took place I believe in 
November and December of 1992? 
MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. And the only thing you 
intend to offer is just certified copies of the conviction? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, do you have the convictions? 
MR. SAUNDERS: We do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you given copies of those to 
Mr. Lawrence so he can take a look at those? 
MR. SAUNDERS: We'll be happy to do that, your 
Honor, certified copies of those. I think he's aware of 
those but we'll be happy to provide certified copies. They 
do show on his rap sheet I think that we gave you a copy of, 
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THE COURT: I just think based on the analysis in 
State versus Taylor and State versus Ramirez that were cited 
in the prosecutor's brief, it's just the similarities between 
what he's on trial for and the prior convictions are close 
enough here to — obviously what a jury's trying to decide 
here is whether or not the defendant's involved in the sale 
or distribution of drugs. And I would think that somebody's 
who's claiming that they just happened to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time, that's a little different situation 
than somebody who has been involved in selling drugs or ! 
distributing drugs in the past and now is on trial for the 
same thing. So I do think it's relevant in this case because 
it goes to the question of state of mind and whether or not 
he knew about the drugs in this particular case. I'll grant 
the motion under 404(b) and to allow the state to introduce 
the prior convictions. 
All right. Anything that we need to clarify about the 
order as far as the prior convictions? 
MR. SAUNDERS: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lawrence anything else? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. I think you've covered 
everything, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other motions that we 
need to take up at this time or — 
MR. SAUNDERS: No motions, your Honor. We'll 
1 
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COOL AND STUFF. SO WE STARTED HANGING OUT AND STUFF AND IT 
TURNED OUT TO BE THAT HE WAS A RESIDENT AT THE CONDO. 
Q. THAT HE WAS A RESIDENT OF THE CONDO? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. LET'S GO TO THE CONDO. YOU'RE REFERRING TO THE 1120 
ADDRESS? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. WHO OWNS THAT CONDO? 
A. LORI. 
Q. LORI LUCERO? 
A. IS THAT WHAT YOU MEAN? 
Q. YES. 
A. YES, YEAH. 
Q. HOW IS SHE RELATED YOU? 
A. SHE' USED TO BE MARRIED TO MY BOTHER. 
Q. AND YOUR BROTHER IS DECEASED? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. AND WHEN DID YOUR BROTHER PASS AWAY? 
A. '85. 
Q. '85. AND AT ONE POINT IN TIME, YOU AND LORI WERE LIVING 
TOGETHER; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHEN WAS THAT? 
A. THAT WAS WHEN I FIRST GOT RELEASED FROM PRISON. 
Q. WHEN WAS THAT? 
Tracy A. Covinaton, RPR, CSR 
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OKAY, LET'S GO. HE TOOK ME DOWNSTAIRS — 
Q. WAIT. WAIT, I WANT TO BO BACK. 
THE COURT: THE QUESTION, MR. LUCERO, IS NOT THAT 
HARD. WERE YOU ARRESTED? 
THE WITNESS: NO. 
THE COURT: THAT'S THE QUESTION. 
THE WITNESS: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
Q. (BYMR. LAWRENCE) WHEN YOU HAD THIS CONVERSATION THAT YOU 
WERE DESCRIBING, WERE YOU IN SHACKLES? 
A. YES. 
Q. BUT THEY TOLD YOU YOU WERE NOT ARRESTED? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. WHEN DID THEY RELEASE YOU? 
A. AFTER THAT CONVERSATION HE TOOK ME DOWNSTAIRS, SAT ME 
NEXT TO LORI AND CUFFED ME AND LORI AND WALKED AWAY. 
Q. MR. LUCERO, YOU HAD MENTIONED THAT YOU HAD STORED STUFF 
AT LORI'S PLACE WHILE YOU WERE IN PRISON, I BELIEVE; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A. ACTUALLY, NO. I STARTED TO SEE LORI IN 1995 WHEN I WAS 
ON PAROLE BUT I DIDN'T — I DON'T THINK I HAD ANYTHING ~ I 
WAS ONLY RUNNING AROUND WITH HER FOR ABOUT A MONTH AND I HAD 
VIOLATED AND WENT BACK. 
Q. LET ME ASK YOU: WHAT WERE YOU IN PRISON FOR? 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA. 
Tracy A. Covington, RPR, CSR 
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FOUNDATION ABOUT WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED. I THINK THAT WOULD BE 
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
Q. (BY MR. LAWRENCE) I'VE HEARD YOU TALK IN THE A 
VERNACULAR, NOW I HEARD WHAT MR. HARTLEY TALKS (SIC) IS THAT 
THE WAY YOU GUYS USUALLY TALK? 
A. RIGHT. 
MR. LAWRENCE: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE NO FURTHER 
QUESTIONS FOR MR. LUCERO. 
THE COURT: CROSS. 
MR. SAUNDERS: WOULD YOU LIKE TO START THAT NOW, 
YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. LET'S GO AHEAD IF WE COULD. 
MR. SAUNDERS: OKAY. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAUNDERS: 
Q. MR. LUCERO, BACK IN 1993 YOU WERE CONVICTED OF THREE 
COUNTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND ALSO ONE COUNT WITH A POSSESSION OF CONTROL SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, CORRECT? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. FOUR COUNTS ALTOGETHER. 
MR. SAUNDERS: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
HONOR? 
Tracy A. Covington, RPR, CSR 
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CALLED IN AND COMPLAINED AND SAID THAT THE SUSPECT, ANDREW 
LUCERO, IS DEALING A LARGE AMOUNT OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND 
MARIJUANA. HE WAS TELLING THIS PERSON THAT HE WAS SOMEHOW 
INVOLVED WITH MARIJUANA THAT WAS FOUND IN A STORAGE SHED. 
ANDREW RUNS THE TILE MAN ON 13TH AND WASHINGTON. HE DRIVES A 
BIG BLUE BLAZER. HE HIDES HIS DRUGS UNDER THE ASH TRAY IN 
THE SHOP COVERS. ANDREW KEEPS HIS DRUGS AT 1120 CANYON ROAD, 
NUMBER TWO. OKAY. 
THIS IS A CITIZEN COMPLAINT. THIS IS A COMPLAINT THAT 
WAS RECEIVED OVER THE TIP-A-COP LINE. WHAT THINGS DID IT 
VERIFY THAT MR. HARTLEY HAD TOLD AGENT MACHIELSON? FIRST, 
THAT ANDREW LUCERO, IT VERIFIED HIS ADDRESS AS 1120 CANYON 
ROAD, NUMBER TWO. THAT HE OWNED THE TILE MAN. THAT HE WAS 
SELLING LARGE AMOUNTS OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA. SO 
WITH THAT INFORMATION DETECTIVE MACHIELSON HAS NOW 
CORROBORATED SOME OF THE THINGS THAT RUSS HARTLEY TOLD HIM. 
WHAT ELSE DOES HE DO? HE CHECKS THEIR COMPUTER SYSTEM. 
HE DISCOVERS THAT IN FACT THEY SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
RESIDENCE IS 1120 CANYON ROAD, NUMBER TWO. 
WHAT ELSE DOES HE DO? HE CHECKS OUT HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL 
HISTORY AND FINDS OUT THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES HAVE A HISTORY. 
HE'S BEEN CONVICTED BEFORE OF DISTRIBUTING A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. ALSO, POSSESSION WITH INTENT AND WAS CONVICTED BY 
A JURY BACK IN 1993. 


















UNDERSTANDS WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE WRONGLY ACCUSED OF 
SOMETHING. WE WANT TO BE SURE THERE'S NO POSSIBILITY THAT WE 
HAVE ERRED. 
IN THIS CASE HERE I PROPOSE THAT IF YOU LOOK AT THE 
EVIDENCE THE STATE SIMPLY HAS ERRED. THEY HAVE NOT MET THEIR 
BURDEN. IF THAT'S THE RESULT YOU GET, THEN MR. LUCERO IS 
INNOCENT. HIS LANGUAGE MAY BE OFFENSIVE. HIS MANNERISMS AND 
HIS ETHICS MAY BE DESPICABLE. HE'S THE ONE THAT SAID OVER 
TEN YEARS AGO, YES, HE WAS INVOLVED IN DRUGS AND SERVED SOME 
PRISON TIME FOR IT. THAT ONLY GAVE HIM CREDIBILITY WHEN HE 
SAYS AM I GOING TO JEOPARDIZE THAT WITH DRUG TESTING NOW. 
MR. HARTLEY IS SAYING NOW, FOR FOUR YEARS WE SMOKED DOPE 
TWICE A MONTH TOGETHER. 
YOU GET TO LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE AND WEIGHT IT. IF THOSE 
EXPLANATIONS ARE AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY, THEN THAT MEANS IT'S 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. IF YOU HAVE REASONABLE DOUBT THEN WE 
URGE YOU TO DO WHAT YOU ARE COMMITTED TO DO AND THAT IS TO BE 
A TRIER OF THE FACTS, DETERMINE THAT THEY HAVE NOT MET THEIR 
CASE AND RENDER AN ACQUITTAL. 
YOU HAVE THE LAST JURY INSTRUCTION WHERE IT TALKS IN 
TERMS OF YOU HAVE TO HAVE A UNANIMOUS DECISION. THAT DOESN'T 




CAN QUESTION THE JUDGE. IF YOU CAN'T AGREE, YOU GET TO BE A 
HUNG JURY. BUT OTHERWISE YOU HAVE TO AGREE THAT HE'S EITHER 
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WE CAN'T HAVE THAT HAPPEN. SO YOU TELL THEM THAT YOU'VE 
GOT A REAL MEAN JUDGE ON THIS CASE AND HE HAS TOLD US THAT WE 
CAN NOT TALK ABOUT THE CASE TO ANYONE UNTIL IT'S OVER. 
AND AGAIN, DON'T DISCUSS THE CASE WITH ANYONE, DON'T GO 
INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AT ALL. WAIT UNTIL ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE IS IN BEFORE YOU FORM AN OPINION ON THIS CASE. 
AND SO IF THERE'S NOTHING FURTHER, YOU'LL BE EXCUSED FOR 
THE EVENING. WE'LL SEE YOU TOMORROW AT NINE O'CLOCK. 
(THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM.) 
MR. BLAKELY: YOUR HONOR, I — I KNOW THAT — IS THE 
DOOR CLOSED? OKAY. I KNOW THAT THEY'RE GOING TO GO AND 
GET — WELL, SHE'S HERE NOW — ONE OF THE WITNESSES THAT WAS 
SCHEDULED FOR TODAY TO ENSURE THAT THE COURT INSTRUCTS HER TO 
COME BACK TOMORROW. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: ONCE THAT IS DONE, I NEED TO PUT 
SOMETHING ON THE RECORD. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I WAS GOING TO SAY, LET'S HANG ON 
FOR A FEW MINUTES AND MAKE A RECORD HERE OF WHAT HAPPENED AT 
THE BENCH AND — DO YOU HAVE A WITNESS HERE? 
MR. SAUNDERS: WE HAVE HER UNDER COURT SUBPOENA, 
YOUR HONOR, JUST FOR TODAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU WANT TO COME FORWARD, 
MA'AM? AND, AGAIN, YOUR NAME IS? 
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I'LL DENY THE MOTION AT THIS POINT. 
MP.. BLAKF.I.V '~U'-Y. NEAT Y~np M•' -T H" I • -
THE CVUIlT 'JKAY. GO AHEAD. 
MP, RT.AirF.T.Y NEXT, YOUR HONOP, WAS THE -- THE 
QUESTION m T'-i WHFTHFP OP |, ] UK COULD ^Sk uW 
CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. HARTLEY REGARDING SPECIFIC ACTS OF 
DISHONESTY. AND FOR THIS, YOUR HONOR, THFPE HEED" T<~> I F A 
SEPARATION BETWEEN .-. <. uIIVlCTluN ^ND THE ACT THAT UNDERLIES A 
CONVICTION. 
RULE 60 9 '""F THE PETES F EVIDENCE STATE THAT A 
OJLJ', lUTJlJ IS 1JOI GOING TO BE PROPER UNLESS IT INVOLVES AN 
ACT OF DISHONESTY, OR IS A FELONY. 
PULE ^ 3 THOUGH -III I'll 1-L^LIIJJ i E.M ojd(B) ON 
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT AYS: SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 
THE CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOP THE rnppoqp T r-TTA" FIN': ' 
SUPPORTING J'1!!, '..IIUE^ ..1 JKEDIBILIl Y, OTHER THAN CONVICTION OF 
A CRIME AS PROVIDED IN RULE 60 9, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY 
INTRINSIC EVIDENCE. THEY MAY HOWEVEP . Ill l,il I ' LS'JRETI'.N ' i 
THE CuURT, IF PROBATIVE OF TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS BE 
INQUIRED INTO ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, ONE, 
"
r
'NCF,RNTNG THE '"T^ N17-" ' CHAPACTER FOR 1'RUTHFULUESS OR' 
UNTRUTHFULNESS; OR TWO, CONCERNING THE CHARACTER FOR 
TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS OF ANOTHER WTT11F^n I 11 YT 
i ' I T In >K N'T ,' • . 
IN GIVING THE TESTIMONY, WHETHER BY AN ACCUSED OR BY ANY 
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OTHER WITNESS, DOES NOT OPERATE AS A WAIVER OF THE ACCUSED'S 
OR THE WITNESS' PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN 
EXAMINED — OKAY. 
I REALLY THINK, YOUR HONOR, THAT ACTS THAT UNDERLIE A 
CONVICTION OR UNDERLIE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, AS LONG AS 
THE COURT ACTION, BEING CHARGED WITH A CRIME, BEING CONVICTED 
OF A CRIME, OR THAT A CRIMINAL CASE IS PENDING, CAN STILL BE 
GOTTEN INTO UNDER RULE 608(B). 
THE COURT: BUT HE -- HE HASN'T BEEN CHARGED. IT 
WASN'T EVEN REPORTED TO THE POLICE, AT LEAST — 
MR. BLAKELY: ACTUALLY, IT WAS REPORTED TO THE 
POLICE. HE WAS CHARGED WITH THE THEFT AND THERE'S A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE IN EFFECT. SO THE STATUS OF THE CASE IS STILL 
PENDING. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE ALL KNOW HOW A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE WORKS, RIGHT? 
MR. BLAKELY: WELL, YOUR HONOR --
THE COURT: YOU ENTER A PLEA, AS LONG AS HE MEETS 
THE CONDITIONS THEN IT'S DISMISSED. THERE IS NO CONVICTION. 
MR. BLAKELY: AND IT HAS NOT BEEN DISMISSED YET. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: BUT EVEN IF — LET'S SAY FOR INSTANCE 
HE WAS WORKING FOR AN EMPLOYER. THEY FOUND THAT HE WAS 
TAKING MONEY OUT OF THE TILL AND THEY FIRED HIM WITHOUT 
CALLING THE POLICE. IT'S GOING TO BE EXACTLY THE SAME TYPE 
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: OF INSTANCE AS WE HAVE HERE WHERE HE WAS FOUND STEALING TTFA^ 
^ ' FROM THR I- l '• 'll I'IC M'iPi. nil , ALLED 1 n ]• irOLl'-E, HE 
1 CONFESSED THAT HE DID IT, AND THEY FIRED HIM AND ALSO FILED 
^ CRIMINAL CHARGES. 
5 • • WHAT DID THIS PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
6 I DO? 
7 nr BT.AKFJ.V THF H FA, Ml ABEYANCE — 
8 , i . LC' /«E TELL A DEFENDANT THAT HE CAN ENTER 
9 | A PLEA AND THAT IF HE MEETS ALL THE CONDITION?, L™ TUir 1'v,r"1 
' 'f-F 3 : : N . I i L S M I S S I h E L ; - O H , IriLN 1H1J A L L M E A N S 
NOTHING, RIGHT? 
Mr \ ,:LY: THEN THERE'S NO -- V, •;,',,, V,, ,', 1HERE 
.- MILAi, ^ 4 1 ; . ^ ^ , .'ILK HONOR. 
THE (.'O'I JKAY. 
lvr1 i.11,1' ' ' ' rui? p " I ! ' ; T I "M "-!;.11,1 i ' : , i i v c TO 
MAKE IS IF A PERSON IS CHARGED WITH D.U.I., WITHIN 10 DAYS OF 
in 
17 | RECEIVING THE D.U.I. HE CAN MAKE A WRITTEN FEQUEST T<~ THE 
; l> f'T "-'TfTl V II ,' 1 VEHICLES Tu HAVE A HEARING ON WHETHER OR 






JO'JLD BE D I S M I S S E D . 
"i" I "I i "In ,'"... '.."i'l"".!" , r\ l o H T . 
MR. in AKJ;.;I.V AY THE OFFICER IS -- CAN'T BE LOCATED 
,JR prip njiY O^HFR PFasnw, T--" " '" ' TH.T AAAE CAN 
A i ui, DISMISSED; HOWEVER, THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES CAN 
25 STILL GO AHEAD AND SUSPEND HIS LICENSE FOR 3 0 
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ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE. 
IN MUCH THE SAME WAY, THE ACTS UNDERLYING A CRIMINAL 
CASE, IN MY MIND, YOUR HONOR, IS — IS THE TYPE OF THING 
THAT'S LOOKED AT UNDER RULE 608, AS LONG AS WE AVOID ANY TYPE 
OF A MENTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT 
CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT THE CHARGES WERE, BUT RATHER LOOKED AT 
THE FACTS UNDERLYING. 
THE COURT: BUT HOW DO YOU PROPOSE DOING THAT? 
MR. BLAKELY: SIMPLY ASK HIM IF HE EVER — WHY HE 
WAS LAID OFF FROM — FROM WHEELWRIGHTS --
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S — 
MR. BLAKELY: — WITH AN ADMONITION TO HIM BY THE 
STATE THAT HE NOT MENTION ANYTHING REGARDING A CRIMINAL CASE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S SAY HE DENIES THAT HE 
WAS FIRED FOR EMBEZZLING FUNDS, THEN HOW — WHAT DO YOU DO? 
MR. BLAKELY: THEN WE CAN'T DO ANYTHING MORE. 
MR. LAWRENCE: NOT WITH HIM. 
MR. BLAKELY: NOT WITH HIM. 
THE COURT: WELL, WITH ANYONE. 
MR. BLAKELY: WE COULD CALL THE EMPLOYER. 
THE COURT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN IT SAYS HERE 
UNDER SUBSECTION 2 THOUGH THAT SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF THE 
CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THE 
WITNESS1 CREDIBILITY, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS. 
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1 WHAT CJEi iflrii' MEAN TO YOU? 
2 MR. BLAKEL'i i hi I , YOUR HONOR, IT MEANS -" 
3 EP.INGING 'M -1"' "TPFP TYIK .F .h.r,1 Mil, THE DRAFTERS OF 
4 ' a.o .-.ULE OF EVIDENCE COULD HAVE SAID OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS 
5 THEY DIDN'T SAY THAI, THEY SATO 'Tnrp THAU EXTRINSIC 
6 r"T rF?rE WHI.H --UI -„.k.K MORE THAW CONVICTIONS. 
7 THE COURT i] W, THE OTHER QUESTION I'.HAVE TS ynrj'FF 
8 SAYING THAT IT f^FS ^O nT^H~TiTrr-
MK. BLAKE, I,, RIGHT, 
ii THK COURT: IF YOU LOOK AT °'"' "P i',ni II DuESN'I 
I TALK AROnT n r sHnNF,qi , . • ;E DISHONESTY COMES UP IS 
' 1IJ i,UL». 
: I MR BLAKELY: TRUTHFULNESS -F UNTFUTHFULL-JESS. 
infi' THINK THEY MEAN THE SAME? 
3LAKELY: NOT NECESSARILY. 
; J n|,'|> FTGHT. 
oxoAKELY: NOT NECESSARY; HOWEVER, I DO THINK 
J THAT WE HAVE AN INSTANCE HERE OF nNTPnTHFULIIESS. 
Till', ,MITFT KAY. BUT THERE IS A CASE OUTTHFFE 
0 M H T DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT NAME OF IT BECAUSE I WAS ETTln 
1 ' F SURPRISED BY IT -- WHERE AN TNPTVTDUAL JM I'UI-JI UCIKJJIED 
.'  I "<' TIFFT', i i I _. bLMLANuR THEFT. THE COURT SAID JUST BECAUSE 
.OU'VE BEEN CONVICTED OF A THEFT DOESN'T EQUATE WITH 
4 DISHONESTY. 
M* -*"SLY: TRUE. YOU NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE 
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FACTS UNDERLYING IT. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND THAT'S WHY I'M SAYING, JUST 
BECAUSE HE'S BEEN FIRED FOR EMBEZZLEMENT MAY NOT NECESSARILY 
MEAN HE'S UNTRUTHFUL, BUT — 
MR. BLAKELY: TRUE. WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS CASE, 
YOUR HONOR, AND LET ME GIVE YOU THE FACTS ON THIS. HE WAS 
WORKING FOR A — 
MR. SAUNDERS: WELL, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THIS, 
YOUR HONOR. THE FACTS FROM WHOM? 
THE COURT: WELL, LET — LET ME HEAR HIM OUT. LET 
ME HEAR WHAT HE HAS TO SAY AND THEN YOU'LL — I'LL GIVE YOU A 
CHANCE TO RESPOND. 
MR. BLAKELY: AND, YOUR HONOR, I'M PARAPHRASING THE 
POLICE REPORT THAT I READ ON THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: MR. HARTLEY WAS WORKING -- WHAT'S THE 
NAME OF IT? 
MR. LAWRENCE: WHEELWRIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: FOR WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: HE ASSISTED PEOPLE IN GETTING LUMBER 
FROM THE BACK OF THE LUMBER YARD, LOADING IT INTO THEIR 
VEHICLES, TAKING IT TO THEIR HOME, AND THEN DOING 
CONSTRUCTION WORK ON THEIR HOME WITH THE MATERIALS THAT WAS 




,! LUMBER FOR THE THINGS THAT WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE BACK OF 
I THEIR YARD. W T ^ H D ^ n ^ T T " ' I THAT Ht, V.'A,.., D-IMj THAI 
| Wuhi\ tuK THESE PEOPLE ON THEIR HOMES. 
I WHEN CONFRONTED WITH IT, HE SAID, OF. M 7 " 1 W W 
J p-^p'p- ! ; TMPLY DAN" I i'lJii,j"i. ULLJNIELJ, DENIED, DENIED, 
I 
1 SEVERAL TIMES. AND THEN FINALLY WHEN HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH 
| WHAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD 3Y T"" rr^^pp """"AT lU- * r
 4 OF V; VOK F-R 
I M M - ODT-.i ^ON-rhJSED AND SAID YES, I DID II, JUST GIVE 
i 
ME A CHANCE TO PAY YOU BACK SO. 
SD TwFP r V^S ?nr-Ttrr . SPEOIFLC INSTANCES ',L' 
' ^NTt-uI'HFULNESS THERE: NUMBER ONE, BEING UNTRUTHFUL TO THE 
PERSON THAT HE WAS GETTING THE LUMBER F^R MTP DIMM; H E 
! PROTECTS FIR; NUMBER I,1 cLJIJ.. UNTRUTHFUL TO HIS EMPLOYER IN 
j WHETHER OR NOT HE'D DONE IT. 
THE "' • •' i , ' -"", 'r ' " ' i i i i 1 ' ' " LIJL1 '-s. '.Ac." 
' - f ^ .,:.,i', .-.onT ON POINT THAT SAYS FIRING SOMEBODY FOR 
EMBEZZLEMENT CONSTITUTES UNTRUTHFULNESS, 7,TL
 ?Ep-2.->r< -;-p 
I '> r""r-' :' ' " "-ECON'SlDLr . .; ..„*•. . b'JT AS IT SITS 
I RIGHT NOV,-, i',-3 JUST NOT INCLINED 70 GRANT : MEAN, 
i 
» 3THERWISE IT MAKES SUCH A MOCKERY OUT - F ~^T ^ -'{"n V'4 THAT 
i 
| -'• " "•• ' ' - •• .'.--AUK IS WITH CONVICTIONS 
' .ND iHEY'VE EITHER GOT TO BE FELONIES OR THEY HAVE TO INVOLVE 
l 
! VCTS OF DISHONESTY. r lir.'.,, ""H 1-v " ;- ; I ,i LEAP r 
\ iHE M'LEo ULM "I WE'RE VERY STRICT ABOUT ATTACKING WITH 
! SPECIFIC INSTANCES. 
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MR. BLAKELY: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: AND THAT'S WHAT THIS IS. YOU'RE — YOU 
WANT TO BE ABLE TO ASK HIM WHY HE WAS FIRED FROM HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AND YET THERE'S NO CONVICTION. HAD HE BEEN 
CONVICTED, IT WOULD BE A LOT EASIER. 
MR. BLAKELY: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: BUT HE HASN'T BEEN. IT'S A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE, RIGHT? 
MR. BLAKELY: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: BUT — BUT THEN IT BRINGS TO QUESTION 
WHY WE HAVE RULE 608(B) IN ADDITION TO RULE 609. 
THE COURT: WELL, 6 -- 608 — 609 I THINK IS PRETTY 
CLEAR. 
MR. BLAKELY: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: 608 IS REALLY TALKING ABOUT OPINION AND 
REPUTATION EVIDENCE. DOES HE HAVE A REPUTATION IN THE 
COMMUNITY FOR BEING DISHONEST OR HONEST OR TRUTHFUL? I MEAN, 
YOU CAN PARADE ALL THE WITNESSES YOU WANT FOR THAT QUESTION. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. 
THE COURT: BUT THEN WHEN WE GET DOWN TO SPECIFIC 
CONDUCT UNDER (B), I THINK IT'S VERY NARROW ABOUT WHAT 
SPECIFIC CONDUCT YOU CAN GO INTO. 
SO LET ME HEAR FROM MR. SAUNDERS ON THAT MATTER. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. 
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MR. SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE COURT'S 
EXACTLY RIGHT THAT I T DOES S r TM T " PF T 1NF-TF Mil" ! ,"l i " 
T H A T ' S WHY THE RULE WAS WRITTEN T H I S WAY. WHAT I T SAYS I S 
THEY MAY, HOWEVER, IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
SO TF YuilR I T T I M R ' A OPINION I . BASE. . _ . . 
HEARD THAT YOUR FEELING I S T H I S SHOULDN'T COME I N , T H A T ' S 
WITHIN YOUR DISCRETION AND YOU CAN DECIDE - -
THF. COURT: WH,L, LA U' I ' L L TELL YOU WHAT I ' M 
BOTHERED BY. T H E R E ' S NO QUESTION CERTAINLY THE DEFENSE CAN 
ASK QUESTIONS THAT D T A T F D T T 11 T" O P E D I B I L l J i I LEAN, 
THAT 1!.!/,':.:.: FAIR GAME, H I S C R E D I B I L I T Y I S A BIG ISSUE HERE. 
WHAT I ' M CONCERNED ABOUT I S THAT I T ' S A PLEA II] AEEYANCE, 
AND T KEEP THINKING T H E R E " : •'• FAIPLY PECENT CASE THAT TALKS 
ABOUT HOW WE TREAT PLEA IN ABEYANCE CASES WHEN THEY'RE 
S T I L L 
MR. SAUNDERS: THEY'RE NOT CONSIDERED CONVICTIONS. 
THE COURT: S T I L L OUT THERE. 
MR. BLAKELY: FTGHT. r m , ' ' P F i|, T , • \] i ; [ L . > [ ] . : . I 
AGREE, i'UUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: R I G H T . AND I ' M JUST TRYING TO FIGUPE 
i ll"]T W I i a T Til l" , ' D S M T l T T r D T T i il,[ [ '.' I,1 Ml,' r V i l J U " , ' I I.I M i l l L ' M ' I ' L ' U C A p T F A, 
J. « i i. .i. w i .i j . . j . i >I i i ' i i J i i i ,_ _/1 i j — I U i n i u < L / J m i J J I \ U x i J_ J _ J l _ j i i 
I [J ABEYANCE AND T H E R E ' S NO CONVICTION, HOW CAN WE THEN 
CIRCUMVENT THAT AND SAY WELL, IT FALLS FNnFR f n o fP , ? ' i n . 
THAT'; ' . THAT':.: WHAT I ' l l HAVING TROUBLE WITH SO — 
MR. LI Lui'dvUL >' , MY ONLY CONCERN, YOUR HONOR, ^IS THAT 
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IF WE FIND AN INSTANCE OF SPECIFIC UNTRUTHFUL CONDUCT — 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: — AND WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE WERE CRIMINAL CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE WOULDN'T 
THEN BE ABLE TO ASK IT. BECAUSE IF THERE WERE CRIMINAL 
CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE BETTER CHECK AND SEE IF 
THERE'S A CONVICTION. 
DO YOU SEE MY QUANDARY, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: RIGHT. I DO. 
ALL RIGHT. WELL, I'LL — I'LL TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT 
FOR THE TIME BEING. I MEAN, INITIALLY I THINK I'VE DENIED 
IT, BUT IF YOU WANT TO TAKE A LOOK AND SEE IF THERE'S ANY 
CASE LAW OUT THERE, I'LL CERTAINLY RECONSIDER THE ISSUE. BUT 
AS IT STANDS RIGHT NOW, I'M JUST NOT INCLINED TO LET YOU GO 
INTO THAT. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. AND I -- I BELIEVE THERE WAS 
ONE ADDITIONAL MOTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. LAWRENCE: THE OTHER THING, YOUR HONOR, I WANT 
TO DO, I WANT TO RENEW — I DID MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON 
THE STATEMENTS THAT WERE ALLOWED IN THROUGH THE TAPE, CLOSE 
ENOUGH AKIN TO THE WITNESS TAMPERING OF MR. HARTLEY, AND THE 
VERY SPECIFIC COMMENTS ABOUT THREATENED MY LIFE AND THAT. I 
THINK THE JURY IS TAINTED ON THAT. SO I WOULD ASK FOR A 
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Q. SO I WANT TO GO THE DAY BEFORE THEN. DID YOU MEET OR DID 
YOU HAVE AN OCCASION TO MEET WITH RUSS HARTLEY ON THE 5TH OF 
MARCH? 
A. I DIDN'T HAVE ANY PLANS TO MEET WITH RUSS. HE JUST 






AT NUMBER TWO AT 1120, 
OKAY. DID HE GIVE YOU ANY MONEY? 
YEAH. 
HOW MUCH DID HE GIVE YOU? 
HE GAVE ME A HUNDRED BUCKS. 
Q. WHAT WAS IT FOR? 
A. WELL, SINCE HE BEEN — SINCE HE LOST HIS WHEELRIGHT JOB, 
YOU KNOW, HE NEEDED SOME MONEY BECAUSE HE DIDN'T HAVE A JOB 
SO — AND THAT'S WHERE WE STARTED KIND OF WORKING TOGETHER. 
WELL, ACTUALLY, HE LOST HIS JOB BECAUSE I GAVE HIM SOME WORK 
FROM A CUSTOMER THAT I HAD DOING TILE WORK FOR ME. AND BUT 








SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR — 
WITNESS: ~ STEALING FROM THAT JOB AND STUFF 
SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR, OBJECTION. YOUR HONOR — 
COURT: WAIT A MINUTE. THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION. 
IS WHY YOU GAVE HIM A HUNDRED DOLLARS, SIR. 
WITNESS: OH, OKAY. 
Tracy A. Covington, RPR, CSR 
154 
THE COURT: LET'S FOCUS ON THE QUESTION. 
THE WITNESS: WELL, HE GAVE ME SOME MONEY BECAUSE HE 
WAS BORROWING MONEY FROM ME EVER SINCE HE LOST THAT 
WHEELRIGHT JOB. 
Q. (BYMR. LAWRENCE) SO ON MARCH 5TH DID HE GIVE YOU MONEY? 
A. YES, HE DID. 
Q. HOW MUCH DID HE GIVE YOU? 
A. HE GAVE ME A HUNDRED DOLLAR BILL. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU HEARD LEO VANDERSTAPPEN HERE. WAS HE 
THERE AT THAT TIME? 
A. YES, HE WAS. 
Q. DID YOU AND MR. HARTLEY GET INTO AN ARGUMENT? 
A. YEAH. BECAUSE HE NEVER KEPT HIS WORD, YOU KNOW, I USED 
MY MONEY AND THAT. WHEN HE STARTED BORROWING MONEY FROM HIM 
I'D SAY, OKAY, WHEN YOU GOING TO PAY ME BACK BECAUSE I NEEDED 
MY MONEY TO BE BACK TO INVEST IT INTO MY COMPANY AND TO KEEP 
MY MONEY UP. AND IT WAS STARTING TO PISS US OFF AND SO WE 
STARTED FUCKING TALKING BACK AND FORTH AND SHIT, YOU KNOW, 
ABOUT — BECAUSE IT WAS GETTING ME ANGRY BECAUSE HE WASN'T 
KEEPING HIS WORD ON THE PAYMENTS THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO PAY 
ME. SO IT WAS FUCKING PISSING ME OFF AND THAT'S HOW OUR 
RELATIONSHIP STARTED BEING LIKE THAT. 
Q. DID HE EVER GIVE YOU ANYTHING FOR COLLATERAL? 
A. YEAH. WELL, I STARTED TAKING COLLATERAL FROM HIM, THAT 
SPRAY — THAT PAINT GUN THAT WAS LIKE — I THINK THAT WAS THE 
Tracy A. Covington, RPR, CSR 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 011901619 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
The Court, having received the briefs of counsel and heard the arguments of counsel as to 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on January 29,2003, makes the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. The Jury was well aware that the CI, Mr. Hartley was a drug user. How many different 
types of drugs he was using was not a central issue in this case and would not have affected his 
credibility with the Jury. 
3. Mr. Hartley's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case. 
4. At the time that he testified, Mr. Hartley had not been convicted of the misdemeanor theft. 
The fact that Mr. Hartley was convicted of a misdemeanor theft after his testimony in this case does 
not provide a basis for a new trial. 
5. This Court had ruled that the allegation that Mr. Hartley had been fired from his 
employment for theft, was not admissible. Contrary to that ruling, defendant told the Jury at trial that 
Mr. Hartley had been fired for theft. The Jury was well aware of that fact, even though inadmissible, 
and any evidence concerning it would not have had, and did not have an effect on the Jury's verdict. 
6. Luis Ackerman was properly excluded from testifying at trial. He indicated that his 
information about Mr. Hartley's alleged dishonesty, was second hand information. Mr. Ackerman 
testified from what he knew he did not have an opinion about Mr. Hartley honesty or dishonesty. 
Based on those responses, the ruling that his testimony was inadmissible was proper. 
7. The State provided all of the discovery that was required in this case. The defense had all 
of the relevant information at the time of the trial and extensively used that to cross examine the 
State's witnesses. The defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered because of 
the alleged discovery violations. 
8. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, and the demeanor of the witnesses when 
they testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. The rulings of the Court, that the evidence of Mr. Hartley's alleged firing for theft, and that 
Mr. Ackerman's testimony was not admissible, were proper. Despite the Court's rulings to the 
2 
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contrary, defendant told the jury the information about Mr. Hartley anyway. All of that information 
about Mr. Hartley would not have had, and did not have an effect on the verdict of the Jury. 
3. The State provided proper discovery in this case. 
4. Based on how the CI's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case, the 
totality of the eyidence, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome of the trial would not have been any different 
Approved as to form: 
L/DEAN SAUNDERS 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Vl£TOR/LAWRENCE 
torney for Defendant 
ORDER 
Wherefore, Defendant's Motion to for a new trial is Denied. 
DATED this / S, day ofJSISy, 2003. / 
ERNIE W. JONES 
District Court Judge I 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed findings was hand delivered or 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 510290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(COURT'S RULING) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THANK YOU. I — I 
APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AND ALSO THE BRIEFS THAT 
WERE SUBMITTED. 
AS YOU KNOW, IN ORDER TO GRANT A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
THERE HAS TO BE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE OUTCOME 
WOULD BE DIFFERENT. AND, FRANKLY, AFTER HEARING THE ARGUMENT 
AND LOOKING AT THE MEMORANDUMS, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT 
THE — THAT THERE'S A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD HERE THAT THE 
OUTCOME WOULD BE ANY DIFFERENT IF WE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. I 
MEAN, THE WHOLE CONCEPT IS TO GIVE A DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. 
NOBODY CAN EVER GET A PERFECT TRIAL. THAT'S — THAT'S JUST 
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT MR. LUCERO 
GOT A FAIR TRIAL IN THIS CASE. 
WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE ISSUES HERE THAT YOU'VE 
RAISED ABOUT THE C.I., I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION 
THAT EVERYBODY IN THIS COURTROOM KNEW THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT HAD USED DRUGS. BUT I DON'T RECALL ANYBODY REALLY 
PRESSING HIM ABOUT THE TYPE OF DRUG THAT HE WAS USING, 
WHETHER IT WAS MARIJUANA, COCAINE, METHAMPHETAMINE, BUT IT 
WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS A DRUG USER AT ONE POINT. 
I'M JUST NOT SURE THAT IT MAKES ANY DIFFERENCE IN THIS 
CASE AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE WAS USING. 
HE ADMITTED ON THE STAND THAT HE'D USED DRUGS IN THE PAST, HE 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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HAD A DRUG PROBLEM. IN FACT, MY RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THAT'S 
THE REASON HE CAME FORWARD. THAT'S THE REASON HE CONTACTED 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IS HE FELT LIKE HE HAD SOME RESPONSIBILITY TO 
TRY TO HELP CORRECT THE PROBLEM, TO GET RID OF THE PEOPLE WHO 
WERE SELLING DRUGS AND USING DRUGS. AND HE JUST FELT LIKE IT 
WAS HIS TURN AND HIS TIME TO COME FORWARD AND TRY TO DO THIS. 
AND SO I JUST -- I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT REALLY AFFECTS 
HIS CREDIBILITY AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE 
WAS USING, AND I JUST DON'T REMEMBER ANYBODY REALLY PRESSING 
HIM HARD AS TO THE TYPE OF DRUG HE WAS USING. 
ON THE QUESTION ABOUT THE — HIS CONVICTION FOR THEFT, 
THE PROBLEM IS THAT AT THE TIME HE TESTIFIED, AT THE TIME OF 
THE TRIAL HE HAD NO CONVICTION FOR THEFT. HE HAD ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA, BUT THAT PLEA HAD BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE BY THE 
COURT SO THERE WAS NO CONVICTION. AND SO WHEN HE GOT ON THE 
WITNESS STAND, HE COULDN'T BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE 
CONVICTION. THERE WAS JUST NO WAY BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
CONVICTION. 
AND SO NOW, SOME MONTHS LATER WHEN HE MAY HAVE VIOLATED 
THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT AND THE CONVICTION IS ENTERED, IF 
THAT'S TRUE, EVERY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHO HAS A 
CONVICTION THAT COMES DOWN AFTER THEY'VE TESTIFIED, WE'D HAVE 
TO SET ASIDE THE CONVICTION AND START ALL OVER AGAIN. BUT AT 
THE TIME HE TESTIFIED — I THINK THAT'S THE CRITICAL POINT. 
WHEN HE TESTIFIED HE HAD NO FELONY CONVICTION FOR THEFT 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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INVOLVING WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
AND THE OTHER THING IS — I THINK MR. SAUNDERS POINTED 
IT OUT — EVEN AFTER I HAD SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT HE COULD 
NOT BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THAT CONVICTION, THE DEFENDANT, 
MR. LUCERO, GOT ON THE WITNESS STAND AND BLURTED IT OUT TO 
THE JURY. THIS JURY KNEW FULL WELL THAT THE REASON THE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT HAD LOST HIS JOB IS BECAUSE HE WAS 
STEALING AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
SO DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO KEEP IT OUT, MR. LUCERO, 
FOR WHATEVER REASON, DECIDED TO LET THE JURY KNOW THAT. SO 
ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, THEY STILL KNEW ABOUT HIM BEING IN 
TROUBLE AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER AND WHY HE LOST HIS JOB. 
AND THEN FINALLY ON MR. ACKERMAN, THE REASON — THERE'S 
NO QUESTION THAT PEOPLE CAN GET ON THE WITNESS STAND AND 
TESTIFY ABOUT SOMEBODY'S CREDIBILITY, BUT THEY'VE GOT TO KNOW 
SOMETHING ABOUT THE PERSON. AND MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT 
MR. ACKERMAN KNEW ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, FIRSTHAND, ABOUT THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, AND SO FOR THAT 
REASON I WASN'T GOING TO ALLOW HIM' TO RENDER AN OPINION ABOUT 
SOMEBODY THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW. 
YEAH, THEY'D WORKED TOGETHER FOR SIX MONTHS, BUT WHEN HE 
WAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH HIS REPUTATION 
IN THE COMMUNITY FOR BEING TRUTHFUL AND HONEST, I THOUGHT HE 
SAID: I DON'T KNOW. I CAN'T RENDER AN OPINION. 
AND SO I THOUGHT IF THAT'S TRUE, I'M NOT GOING TO LET 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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THIS GUY RENDER ANY KIND OF OPINION IF HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY 
BASIS FOR IT. SO THAT WAS THE REASON THAT I PRECLUDED 
MR. ACKERMAN FROM TESTIFYING IS BECAUSE HE HAD NO PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE AS FAR AS REPUTATION. 
SO FOR ALL OF THOSE REASONS, I'M GOING TO DENY THE 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AT THIS POINT. 
MR. SAUNDERS: WOULD YOU LIKE THE STATE TO PREPARE 
THE FINDINGS? 
THE COURT: YES, WOULD YOU PREPARE AN ORDER TO THAT 
EFFECT. 
(COURT'S RULING CONCLUDES) 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, LAURIE SHINGLE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
FIVE PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE 
RECORD OF THE COURT'S RULING TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE 
AND ABILITY AS A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER FOR THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH, THIS THE {^ DAY OF FEBRUARY, 
2003 
LAURIE SHINGLE, C.fil.R 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
Addendum F 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath, or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah. R. Evid. 404(b): 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b): 
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness5 credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved 
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by an other 
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' 
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters 
which relate only to credibility. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a): 
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, 
(a)(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which the witness was convicted,. . . and 
(a)(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
